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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many promises are made in merger negotiations but not all promises 
are necessarily enforceable or consistent with a board of directors' fiduciary 
duties.  This Article explores the enforceability of one such promise:  the 
buyer's standstill agreement.  When a publicly traded company explores a 
sale and allows potential buyers access to its confidential information, that 
company, the target, customarily requires each potential buyer to execute a 
confidentiality agreement containing a standstill provision.1  A typical 
standstill2 prevents potential buyers from publicly announcing a bid for the 
target, without the target's prior consent, for a period of approximately 
twelve to twenty-four months from the conclusion of the sales process or 
auction.3  Standstills help targets control the bidding process, as well as 
prevent potential buyers from using the confidential information obtained 
during due diligence to make a bid outside of the formal sales process.4  
 
                                                                                                         
1See William G. Lawlor, Taming the Tiger: Difficult Standstill Agreement Issues for 
Targets, DEAL LAWYERS (July-Aug. 2007), at 7, available at http://www.dechert.com/ 
files/Publication/c224a19d-bf74-40f8-96d1-38f2627a483d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 
e58245b1-30cb-4ee2-833a-3cedd2585bf3/C%26SLawlor-TamingtheTiger.pdf (explaining public 
target companies "almost always" have potential acquirers execute standstills when conducting 
bidding processes either for themselves or for a major asset); see also S. Union Co. v. Sw. Gas 
Corp., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1034 (D. Ariz. 2002) ("'In deals for public companies, it would be 
extraordinary for there not to be' a confidentiality and standstill agreement.").  
2See generally Lawlor, supra note 1.  Standstills can exist as a separate agreement but 
more typically are incorporated as a provision in a confidentiality agreement.  The terms standstill, 
standstill agreement, and standstill provision will be used interchangeably in this Article despite 
whether the standstill appears as an individual standalone agreement or as a provision in a 
confidentiality agreement. 
3See infra Part II.B. 
4Lawlor, supra note 1, at 7 ("Th[e] [standstill] provision backstops the restrictions 
regarding the use of confidential information given by the target to prospective buyers. It also 
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Standstills also assure potential buyers that if they ultimately "win" the 
auction and execute a definitive acquisition agreement with the target 
company, any potential buyers who "lost" the auction will be contractually 
bound to not overbid.5  This helps avoid hostile third-party bids after an 
acquisition is underway.6      
The enforcement of standstills can cause a conflict between two 
fundamental principles of mergers and acquisitions ("M&A").  The first 
principle obligates the target's board of directors to maximize stockholder 
value when selling a controlling stake of a target company.7  This obligation 
is known as a board's Revlon duties.8  The second fundamental principle 
sanctions covenants within acquisition agreements aimed at thwarting third 
parties from overbidding between the signing and closing of a merger (or 
the pre-closing period).9  These provisions are typically called "deal 
protection devices," and standstills are one variation of these devices.10  The 
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co.11 and its progeny expressly allow deal protection devices under certain 
circumstances, and further announced the judicial standard of review for 
these devices.12  A board's Revlon duties, along with the possible protections 
afforded to deal protection devices under Unocal, may create an 
irreconcilable conflict during the pre-closing period if a third party attempts 
to overbid.13  At the same time, however, the promise of these devices may 
help a target satisfy its Revlon duties prior to the execution of an agreement 
                                                                                                         
provides a stable environment in which the sales process can be managed and controlled by the 
target.").  
5See infra Part II.B. 
6See Dennis J. Block, Public Company M&A:  Recent Developments in Corporate 
Control, Protective Mechanisms and Other Deal Protection Techniques, in CONTESTS FOR 
CORPORATE CONTROL 2008:  CURRENT OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES IN M&A 
TRANSACTIONS, at 93 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 13964, 2008) 
(stating standstills can restrict bidders from attempting hostile takeovers).  
7Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) 
(characterizing corporate directors as "auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the 
stockholders at a sale of the company").  
8LOU R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, 
SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS § 4.04[3], at 4-50 (2010) (describing the aforementioned obligation 
as the "Revlon duty").  
9This Article will refer to the period between the execution of a definitive acquisition 
agreement and the closing of the transaction as the pre-closing period. 
10See, e.g., Block, supra note 6, at 91-93 (listing standstill provisions as a deal protection 
mechanism).  
11493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
12See infra Part II.A.2. 
13See Lawlor, supra note 1, at 11 ("The limits placed on any interlopers…have yet to be 
fleshed out by the courts."). 
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during the pre-signing period.14  As commonly argued, the availability and 
promise of these devices may encourage a potential buyer to pay more for 
the target because the covenants provide certain assurances that the 
executed merger agreement may not be overbid.15  Thus, during the pre-
signing period,  a target's board may have good reason to agree to deal 
protection devices because the devices may pass under Unocal.  However, 
pre-closing, the devices may inhibit the satisfaction of a board's Revlon 
duties if a higher bid were to emerge.  Deal protection devices, including 
standstills, may prevent a board from considering a third party offer or 
discourage a third party from making an overbid in the first place.16  
Although standstills have been used in M&A deals since at least the 
early 1980s, the scant Delaware case law provides little help to target 
boards in resolving the conflict described above.17  Academics have paid 
very little attention to standstills over the past three decades, leaving a vast 
gap in academic literature regarding the potential conflict standstills create 
between Revlon and Unocal.18  Despite this, a number of recent deals and 
cases mainly outside of Delaware highlight the need to answer these 
unanswered questions.19  This Article begins to fill a thirty-year void in 
M&A literature by addressing the primary question found at the nexus 
between the Revlon duty to maximize stockholder value, and the board's 
ability to protect an executed transaction under Unocal.  The conflict at the 
heart of this nexus is best illustrated by the hypothetical situation presented 
in the following paragraphs.   
 
                                                                                                         
14See infra Part IV.A.2. 
15For example, Chancellor Leo Strine of the Delaware Court of Chancery indicated, while 
 a Vice Chancellor, in dicta, that a standstill may be required in a pre-signing sales process to "to 
give the [target] leverage to extract concessions from the parties who seek to make a bid."  In re 
Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
16See Paul Povel & Rajdeep Singh, Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders, 19 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 1399, 1402 (2006) ("These [deal protection] devices make the target less attractive to 
rejected bidders, thereby reducing their incentive to top up the winning bid.").  Contra In re 
OPENLANE, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2011 WL 4599662, at *10 n.53 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011) 
(recognizing deal protection devices may discourage bidders but also indicating, in dicta, a 
fiduciary out clause may not be necessary when considering the fact that sophisticated bidders are 
already on notice that Delaware courts may not enforce an agreement lacking a fiduciary out if the 
bidder presents a board with a superior offer).   
17See Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE 
L.J. 621, 659 n.164 (2003) (noting that standstill agreements "first appeared in the early 1980s"); 
Lawlor, supra note 1, at 7 ("Remarkably, while standstills have been prevalent for a long time, the 
case law in the area is relatively sparse."). 
18Subramanian, supra note 17, at 659 ("Surprisingly, despite their important implications 
for the interplay between negotiated and hostile acquisitions, standstill agreements have not 
received attention from modern academic commentators."). 
19See infra Part III.    
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To illustrate, assume a publicly-traded Delaware corporation 
("Delaware Corp.") decides to put itself up for sale in an auction process.  
Delaware Corp. hires a financial advisor who contacts a number of potential 
bidders regarding their interest in participating in the auction.  Six 
companies decide to partake in the auction.  Before receiving confidential 
information, however, Delaware Corp. and its financial advisor require that 
each bidder execute a separate confidentiality agreement with Delaware 
Corp. Each confidentiality agreement includes a standstill provision, 
preventing the bidder "from making or announcing any bid outside of the 
auction process for a period of 18 months following the conclusion of the 
auction."20     
Two of the six bidders make it to the final round of bidding and each 
submits a bid.  "Bidder A" wins the auction by submitting an all-cash offer 
of $51 per share, beating out "Bidder B"'s $49 per share all-cash offer.  
Bidder A and Delaware Corp. enter into a merger agreement with closing 
expected to occur in a few months.  The merger agreement contains a 
"fiduciary out" provision, allowing Delaware Corp. to enter into 
negotiations with, and provide information to, a third party who makes an 
offer that is, or is likely to become, superior in value to the agreement with 
Bidder A.  Because of this provision, Delaware Corp. is allowed to 
terminate the agreement with Bidder A in order to accept a superior third 
party offer.  The goal of these "fiduciary out" provisions is to allow the 
Delaware Corp. board to continue to satisfy its Revlon duties during the pre-
closing period.   
Now, assume that two weeks after Delaware Corp. executed the 
agreement with Bidder A, Bidder B submits an offer—in contravention of 
the previously executed standstill—of $53 per share.  At this point, Bidder 
B's bid raises a number of questions:  (1) whether under Delaware law 
Delaware Corp. may consider the $53 offer; (2) whether the standstill is 
enforceable; and (3) if the standstill is enforceable, who has the ability to 
enforce it— Delaware Corp. or Bidder A.21   
Suppose during the pre-signing negotiations with A, in order to 
extract a higher price from Bidder A, Delaware Corp. promises not to waive 
all previously executed standstills.  This promise further personifies a 
 
                                                                                                         
20Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc., 647 F.3d 291, 297 (6th Cir. 2011).   
21For this final question, see, e.g., William T. Allen, Overview of Process Issues in Going 
Private Transaction, in GOING PRIVATE  2011: DOING THE DEAL RIGHT, at 52 (PLI Corp. Law & 
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 28673, 2011) (asking if "a Special Committee in an auction 
or quasi-auction process contractually obligates bidders not to overbid, is such a contract term 
enforceable, and if so, by whom?").  
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possible tension between the board's Revlon duties and its ability to protect 
an executed transaction under Unocal.  Delaware courts, and most other 
courts, have not yet addressed whether a target board's promise not to waive 
a standstill is consistent with the board's fiduciary duties.22  Furthermore, 
assume that Delaware Corp. and Bidder A's merger agreement contains a 
covenant providing for a breach of the agreement if Delaware Corp. did not 
seek all judicial relief in the event of an overbid made in contravention of a 
standstill.  The Delaware courts have never addressed the validity of such a 
covenant.23  Finally, assume that, while Delaware Corp. is negotiating with 
Bidder A, Delaware Corp. grants Bidder A the right "to enforce any existing 
Standstill Agreements with third parties" in the merger agreement.24  
Although a Canadian court upheld a similar grant,25 whether Delaware 
courts would do the same is anything but clear. 
This Article addresses how Delaware courts would likely answer the 
unanswered questions illustrated in the hypothetical above.26  Part II 
provides an overview of the pre-signing sales process and a board's 
fiduciary duties in M&A transactions.  In addition, it explores the roles of 
pre-signing sales agreements in the bidding process and specifically 
examines confidentiality agreements and standstills.  Part II concludes by 
 
                                                                                                         
22See, e.g., Lawlor, supra note 1, at 7 ("Given the target board's fiduciary duties and the 
questionable third party beneficiary status of the winning bidder, the enforceability of these 
provisions is not free from doubt."); Steven M. Davidoff, Bidders Behaving Badly, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALB%K (Sept. 14, 2009, 2:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/bidders-behaving-
badly/ ("Delaware may or may not enjoin a bidder from breaching a standstill to offer a competing 
higher bid or otherwise allow a company to contractually override its fiduciary duties to consider a 
higher, competing bid."). As this Article went to print, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a 
couple of rulings providing insight into how the court may rule on Don’t-Ask-Don’t-Waive 
standstills in the future.  See The Court’s Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 
In re Ancestry.com Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012) (stating 
Don’t-Ask-Don’t-Waive standstills could be consistent with a board’s fiduciary duties if the board 
uses them for a specific value maximizing purpose); Telephonic Oral Argument and the Court’s 
Ruling, In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 
2012) (finding that target board likely violated its fiduciary duties by agreeing to a Don’t-Ask-
Don’t-Waive standstill as it prevented the board from “properly evaluat[ing] a competing offer, 
disclos[ing] material information, and mak[ing] a meaningful merger recommendation to its 
stockholders”). 
23See Allen, supra note 21, at 52 (questioning whether it is a breach of the merger 
agreement when a target fails to seek all available judicial relief against an overbidder where there 
was an agreement to not overbid).  
24Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc., 647 F.3d 291, 299 (6th Cir. 2011). 
25Ventas Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Inv. Trust (2007), 85 O.R. (3d) 254, 
para. 35 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
26This Article does not necessarily reflect my normative views of how these issues should 
be resolved.  Instead, I argue that Delaware courts would apply and interpret Revlon, Unocal, and 
their progeny to decide these issues on a case-by-case basis. 
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exploring the role fiduciary outs play in the pre-closing period and their 
interplay with standstills.  Part III examines standstill case law and 
unlitigated examples of overbids involving standstills.  This part 
specifically focuses on overbids made in contravention of a previously 
executed standstill and emphasizes the interplay between standstills and 
target board's fiduciary duties.  Part IV argues that, when ultimately 
presented with the questions illustrated above, Delaware courts will answer 
each question by examining the value maximization tools utilized by the 
board pre-signing to determine the reasonableness of the board's decision-
making process.  Moreover, in determining whether the board can decide 
not to consider an offer, agree not to waive a standstill, or grant the 
"winner" the right to enforce a standstill, the courts—in accordance with 
Unocal—will also consider the purpose of the board's actions under the 
circumstances of each case.  Specifically, if a valid value maximization 
purpose is articulated and the board is not acting to further its own self-
interests, then a Delaware court would likely find the board's actions to be 
reasonable and uphold the board's promises.  
II.  STANDSTILLS IN THE BIDDING PROCESS & THE ROLE OF FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES 
The types of standstills that are the subject of this Article are 
generally entered into during the pre-signing sales process and have a 
continuing effect during the pre-closing period.  This Article refers to the 
activities taking place during the pre-signing period interchangeably as the 
"sales process" or the "bidding process." 
During the pre-signing sales process and continuing into the pre-
closing period, compliance with the target's board of directors' fiduciary 
duties controls the legitimacy of the acquisition and other ancillary 
agreements as well as the identity of the "winning bidder" if more than one 
bidder is seeking to acquire the target.  As a result, the target board's 
fiduciary duties are a primary consideration when examining standstills and 
their role during the pre-closing period.  This section provides an overview 
of the pre-signing sales process, a board's fiduciary duties in the context of 
M&A transactions, and the role of fiduciary outs during the pre-closing 
period. 
A.  Fiduciary Duties and the Pre-Signing Bidding Sales Process 
In the M&A world, the nature of the transaction drives many issues, 
including applicable statutory regulations and the appropriate standard that 
the target boards' actions must meet.  Unless otherwise indicated, when 
8 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 37 
referring to transactions in this Article, it is assumed that the transaction at 
issue involves a publicly traded target company, and further, that the target 
is being sold as an entire unit for cash, or a mix of cash and stock as 
consideration.  In the public company realm, this type of transaction is 
typically accomplished by a merger.27  The sale of the target as a unit differs 
from the sale of a major asset, division, or subsidiary as those sales may be 
accomplished by way of a variety of other transaction structures.28  In 
addition, the execution of a contract involving a major asset, division, or 
subsidiary typically does not result in competition from third parties.29  
Hence, the overbidding fact patterns at issue in this Article generally would 
not arise in the sale of a major asset, division, or subsidiary.30  
In negotiated M&A transactions, the board acts as a gatekeeper.31  
Under Delaware law, if a company is to be acquired by way of a merger, the 
required vote is by a majority of the outstanding voting shares.32  However, 
the shareholders' right to vote only comes into play once the board has 
approved the merger and has entered into a definitive agreement.33  That is, 
the "shareholders must be persuaded to approve the transaction."34  Despite 
this, the board is vested with the initial decision as to whether the company 
should engage in an M&A transaction in the first place and, if so, in what 
manner and with whom that transaction should take place.35 
 
                                                                                                         
27See Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Though MAC 
Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2017 (2009)           
            ("[Transactions involving public companies] are almost invariably structured as statutory   
     mergers . . . .").   
28See Lawlor, supra note 1, at 7 (stating if a company sells a major asset, potential buyers 
will more than likely be asked to execute standstills).  If a company were to sell a major asset, 
subsidiary, or division it would also have the bidders execute standstill agreements.  However, this 
Article focuses on the sale of the target as an entire unit and standstills executed during those 
sales.    
29KLING & NUGENT, supra note 8, § 16.01, at 16-3-16-4. 
30Moreover, the enhanced scrutiny standards discussed in this Article do not apply to such 
transactions unless the asset, division, or subsidiary being sold constitutes all or substantially all of 
the assets of the target.  Id. § 4.04[3], at 4-52. 
31Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 8), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2115769. 
32DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 251(c) (1974). 
33See id. §§ 251(b)-(c) (detailing the authorization process for merger agreements 
requiring shareholder vote); see also Christina M. Sautter, Rethinking Contractual Limits on 
Fiduciary Duties, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 61-65 (2010) [hereinafter Rethinking Contractual 
Limits] (providing a detailed explanation of a board's adoption of a merger agreement and 
submission to the shareholders for a vote).   
34Bainbridge, supra note 31, at 15-16.  
35Id. at 20 ("[S]o long as the board of directors is disinterested and independent, it retains 
full decision-making authority with respect to the transaction.").  
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1.  The Business Judgment Rule 
Similar to other business decisions made by a company's board, the 
courts' default standard of review of a board's decisions in the M&A context 
is the business judgment rule.36  Under this deferential standard, a court 
presumes "that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation 
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company."37  In other words, 
because the business judgment rule is a deferential standard, the board's 
decision will be upheld absent a showing it was "tainted by fraud, illegality, 
self-dealing, or some other exception to the rule."38  However, because of 
the nature of some M&A transactions, there is a greater opportunity for 
directors to act in bad faith or to engage in self-dealing.39  Thus, depending 
on the type of transaction involved, a court may subject the board's actions 
to an enhanced standard.40   
2.  Unocal, The Revlon Doctrine, and Transactions Triggering Revlon 
Beginning in the 1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court began to 
recognize, in judicial opinions, that some fact patterns may call for an 
 
                                                                                                         
36See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (characterizing the business 
judgment rule as an "acknowledgement of the managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors"), 
overruled on other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).  
37Id. 
38Bainbridge, supra note 31, at 17.  
39See id. at 15 (explaining board decisions that are structural in nature, i.e. corporate 
takeovers, "present a final period problem entailing an especially severe conflict of interest").  
More specifically, as Professor Stephen Bainbridge explains, in some types of M&A transactions, 
[t]arget management is no longer subject to shareholder discipline because the 
target's shareholders will be bought out by the acquirer. Target management is no 
longer subject to market discipline because the target by definition will no longer 
operate in the market as an independent agency. As a result, management is no 
longer subject to either shareholder or market penalties for self-dealing. 
Accordingly, there is good reason to be skeptical of management claims to be 
acting in the shareholders' best interests. In turn, the resulting need in this context 
to hold the board accountable for its mistakes appropriately trumps the more 
usual tendency towards judicial deference to the board’s authority. 
Stephen Bainbridge, Did Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg just have a Van Gorkom moment? 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Apr. 18, 2012, 11:06 AM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/ 
professorbainbridgecom/2012/04/did-facebooks-zuckerburg-just-have-a-van-gorkom-
moment.html. 
40See, e.g., KLING & NUGENT, supra note 8, § 4.04[1], at 4-39 to 4-43 (summarizing 
enhanced scrutiny standards applicable to board action taken in response to a hostile takeover and 
transactions involving the sale of a company). 
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enhanced standard of review.41  In particular, in Unocal the Delaware 
Supreme Court announced an enhanced standard specifically applicable to 
board action taken in response to hostile takeover activity.42  More precisely, 
the court found that in these situations there is an "omnipresent specter that 
a board may be acting primarily in its own interests," thereby necessitating 
that the board show "they had reasonable grounds for believing that a 
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of another 
person's stock ownership."43  The court explained that a board could satisfy 
this burden by showing "good faith and [a] reasonable investigation."44  
However, the inquiry does not stop there.45  Additionally, the defensive 
mechanism adopted by the board must also be proportional, or "reasonable 
in relation to the threat posed."46  In a later case applying Unocal, the 
Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that this proportionality inquiry 
involves a two-step analysis.47  Namely, the response taken must not be 
"draconian" (or in other words, neither "coercive [n]or preclusive"),48 and 
secondly, the response must fall within a "range of reasonableness."49   
 
                                                                                                         
41See generally id. § 4.04[1], at 4-39 to 4-43 (describing the evolution of Delaware case 
law regarding the business judgment rule and enhanced scrutiny standards).  Prior to the 1980s, 
courts regularly applied the business judgment rule outside of cases involving a "going private" 
transaction or a parent-subsidiary merger.  Id. § 4.04[1], at 4-39.  Furthermore, "[t]he board's 
process in an arm's length sale of a company to a third party was rarely, if ever, challenged, and 
attacks on the basis of the inadequacy or unfairness of price had to overcome the business 
judgment rule presumption . . . ."  Id. § 4.04[1], at 4-38 (second emphasis added).  However, the 
mid-1980s ushered in a new era for the Delaware courts beginning with Unocal.  Professor Steven 
Davidoff has argued the Delaware Supreme Court switched gears in an attempt to prevent the 
Securities and Exchange Commission from promulgating federal regulations of takeover defenses. 
 See Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal Takeover Regulation, 34 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 211, 240 (2007).  However, Professor Davidoff also notes that once the SEC "released 
this pressure valve," the Delaware Supreme Court issued holdings limiting Revlon's application.  
See id.  Nevertheless, the result is that both hostile and friendly transactions may warrant a stricter 
level of review.  See id.    
42Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
43Id. at 954-55. 
44Id. at 955. 
45Id.  
46Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
47See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387-88 (Del. 1995) (emphasizing 
the bifurcated nature of the process). 
48Id.  The Delaware Supreme Court has further defined a coercive response to be one 
"aimed at forcing upon stockholders a management-sponsored alternative to a hostile offer."  
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935 (Del. 2003).  A preclusive response is 
one that "deprives stockholders of the right to receive all tender offers or precludes a bidder from 
seeking control by fundamentally restricting proxy contests or otherwise."  Id.       
49Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387-88 (quoting Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, 
Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994)).   
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A year following its decision in Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court 
issued another seminal decision—Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc.50  Applying Unocal, the court in that case found Revlon's 
entry into an agreement with a white knight had effectively ended an active 
bidding contest for control of Revlon that had been occurring between the 
white knight and a hostile bidder.51  The Delaware Supreme Court declared 
the deal protection devices in the agreement impermissible because they 
were entered into precisely when the "board's primary duty [had become] 
that of an auctioneer responsible for selling the company to the highest 
bidder."52  The court further stated that, when the break-up of the company 
becomes inevitable, "[t]he directors' role changed from defenders of the 
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the 
stockholders at a sale of the company."53  This auctioneering obligation has 
come to be known as a board's "Revlon duties."54  However, the Delaware 
Supreme Court has since clarified that "there are no special and distinct 
'Revlon duties.'"55  Instead, these so-called "Revlon duties" are simply a way 
of referring to "a particular application of the directors' general duties of 
care and loyalty" with the responsibility being "to maximize short term 
value" when a company is in "Revlon or sale mode."56 
While Revlon actually involved a hostile bidder and the court was 
applying the Unocal standard of review, Delaware courts have extended 
these Revlon duties to negotiated transactions.57  Moreover, although not 
 
                                                                                                         
50506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).  
51Id. at 175-76. 
52Id. at 184. 
53Id. at 182. 
54Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989). 
55Id. (emphasis added).  
56KLING & NUGENT, supra note 8, § 4.04[3], at 4-50.  The Delaware Supreme Court made 
this clear in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., saying:  
We stated in Revlon, and again here, that in a sale of corporate control the 
responsibility of the directors is to get the highest value reasonably attainable for 
the shareholders. Beyond that, there are no special and distinct "Revlon duties". 
Once a finding has been made by a court that the directors have fulfilled their 
fundamental duties of care and loyalty under the foregoing standards, there is no 
further judicial inquiry into the matter.  
559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988) (citation omitted).  
57KLING & NUGENT, supra note 8, § 4.04[3], at 4-51 (describing the willingness of the 
courts, as illustrated by Delaware jurisprudence, to apply the Unocal standard even to transactions 
bearing greater hallmarks of mutual intent); Clark W. Furlow, Reflections on the Revlon Doctrine, 
11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 519, 549 (2009) (“Over time, the fact that Revlon involved a specter of 
entrenchment lost its significance, and the ‘Revlon doctrine’ came to stand for the idea that all 
challenged transaction [sic] involving the sale of the company must be subject to enhanced 
scrutiny.”).   
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free from controversy, Delaware courts also have extended the Unocal-
enhanced scrutiny standard to deal protection devices entered into during a 
negotiated transaction.58  Hence, in negotiated transactions like the ones 
addressed in this Article, standstills are subject to the Unocal-enhanced 
scrutiny analysis while a board's sales process and actions during the pre-
closing period may be subject to the enhanced Revlon standard.59   
Of particular importance for this Article, a recurring question over the 
past couple of decades has been: what types of transactions trigger Revlon 
duties?60  To answer this question, Delaware courts have focused on the type 
of consideration used in the transaction.61  It is well accepted under 
Delaware law that an all-cash transaction triggers Revlon, as "there is no 
tomorrow" for the target's shareholders.62  More specifically, the target's 
shareholders "will forever be shut out from future profits generated by the 
resulting entity as well as the possibility of obtaining a control premium in a 
subsequent transaction."63  In addition, Delaware jurisprudence makes it 
clear that a stock-for-stock transaction will not trigger Revlon unless the end 
result of the transaction is that one entity or person acquires a controlling 
block of shares in the target, making the target's remaining shareholders 
minority owners in the surviving corporation.64  But when the consideration 
 
                                                                                                         
58See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 932 (Del. 2003).        
But see STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR:  SHOTGUN TAKEOVERS, GOVERNMENT BY DEAL, 
AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION 236 (2009) (arguing Delaware Chancery Court decisions 
since Omnicare have narrowed its applicability "where controlling shareholders can't act by 
written consent immediately or the extreme circumstance . . . where a board of a company 
attempts to pass control to an unaffiliated third party without a shareholder vote").  
59See, e.g., Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 932 ("[Under Unocal] [d]efensive devices taken to 
protect a merger agreement executed by a board of directors are intended to give that agreement an 
advantage over any subsequent transactions that materialize before the merger is approved by the 
stockholders . . . . This is analogous to the favored treatment that a board of directors . . . give[s] to 
encourage an initial bidder when it discharges its fiduciary duties under Revlon.").   
60See, e.g., In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S'holder Litig., 2011 WL 2028076, at *12 
(Del. Ch. May 20, 2011) ("[A] question of much ongoing debate . . . is when does a corporation 
enter Revlon mode such that its directors must act reasonably to maximize short-term value of the 
corporation for its stockholders."). 
61See DAVIDOFF, supra note 58, at 236 (describing the flexibility dealmakers have in stock 
transactions because Revlon is generally not applicable).  See also Transcript of Court's Ruling on 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, at 4, Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson, C.A. No. 
5878-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2011) available at www.alston.com/files/docs/occam_Ruling.pdf.  
(recognizing Delaware jurisprudence focuses on change of control which results in debates 
regarding what amount of cash consideration triggers change of control).  
62See Smurfit-Stone, 2011 WL 2028076, at *13.  
63Id. 
64See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994) 
("In the absence of devices protecting minority stockholders, stockholder votes are likely to 
become mere formalities where there is a majority stockholder.") (footnote omitted).    
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used in the transaction is a mix of cash and stock, the Delaware courts have 
yet to establish a bright-line rule.  For example, the Delaware Supreme 
Court has held that when the consideration is 33% cash, Revlon is not 
triggered, but it has not yet addressed deals in which cash exceeds 33%.65  
Recently, the Delaware Court of Chancery stated "even though the 
Delaware Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue directly," a deal in 
which cash amounts to 50% of the consideration, likely triggers 
Revlon.66  Moreover, the Court of Chancery has also held that where cash 
amounts to 62% of the consideration, Revlon is likely triggered.67  
Despite the auctioneering language in Revlon, the Delaware Supreme 
Court has also acknowledged, "no single blueprint" exists for a board to 
satisfy its Revlon duties.68  In addition, the Delaware courts have recognized 
that not every sale requires a full-blown auction process but rather the 
board's decision to sell the company to a particular bidder must meet "a 
reasonableness standard."69  As the late, prominent M&A investment 
banker, Bruce Wasserstein, once wrote, "it can be helpful to think of the 
range of possibilities in terms of two types—the classic two-step auction 
and the negotiated sale."70  Pursuant to Delaware case law, this latter type—
the negotiated sale—can follow a more limited market canvass pre-signing 
or, in some cases, the target's board can rely exclusively on post-signing 
sales activities to ensure the negotiated sale reflects an adequate sale price.71 
 
                                                                                                         
65See In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S'holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 65, 70-71 (Del. 1995) 
(holding Revlon was not triggered in a transaction where cash accounted for 33% of 
consideration). 
66Smurfit-Stone, 2011 WL 2028076, at *11. 
67In re Lukens Inc. S'holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 725, 732 n.25 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
68Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).   
69See Transcript of Court's Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, at 6, 
Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson, C.A. No. 5878-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2011) available at 
www.alston.com/files/docs/occam_Ruling.pdf. ("[Revlon] was a Cunian paradigm shift if there  
ever was one.  We had language in there like 'auction duty, radically altered state,' really 
seemingly heavy duty stuff.  We now know it’s a reasonableness standard."); see also In re 
Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 192 (Del. Ch. 2007) ("Unlike the bare 
rationality standard applicable to garden-variety decisions subject to the business judgment rule, 
the Revlon standard contemplates a judicial examination of the reasonableness of the board’s 
decision-making  process."); Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286 ("Revlon does not demand that every 
change in the control of a Delaware corporation be preceded by a heated bidding contest.").   
70BRUCE WASSERSTEIN, BIG DEAL: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
746 (2000). 
71For a more detailed description of pre-signing market canvasses and post-signing market 
checks, see Christina M. Sautter, Shopping During Extended Store Hours: From No Shops to Go-
Shops - The Development, Effectiveness, and Implications of Go-Shop Provisions in Change of 
Control Transactions, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 525, 539-53 (2008); see also DAVIDOFF, supra note 58, 
at 237-39 (discussing post-signing market checks in the context of a corporate board's Revlon 
duties). See also In re OPENLANE, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2011 WL 4599662, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 
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 Thus, an extensive bidding process does not necessarily precede every 
merger.  However, if the target does not engage in a traditional value 
maximization tool like an auction or market check, "[the] board must 
possess an impeccable knowledge of the company's business for the Court 
to determine that it acted reasonably."72  As such, as discussed in Part IV, a 
Delaware court may be more inclined to allow a target board to take certain 
actions, or not take certain actions, with respect to a standstill if the target 
engages in a more extensive pre-signing sales process.  
B.  The Roles of Confidentiality and Standstill Agreements in the Sales 
Process 
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, target companies that 
choose either a full-blown auction process or a more limited pre-signing 
bidding process are invariably presented with the question as to what 
procedures should be followed to ensure a fair bidding process that still 
guarantees the most value for the company.73 Along these lines, target 
companies must also contend with the possibility of overbidding by losing 
bidders after the process has been completed and the winning bidder has 
entered into an agreement.74  When targets are presented with these issues, 
the overwhelming majority of them choose to execute a confidentiality 
agreement including a standstill provision.75 
Prior to gaining access to non-public information through due 
diligence pre-signing, most bidders must execute a confidentiality 
agreement.76  The confidentiality agreement embodies two conflicting 
                                                                                                         
30, 2011) (describing traditional value maximization tools as including, inter alia, auctions). 
72In re OPENLANE, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2011 WL 4599662, at *5. 
73See Sautter, supra note 71, at 539-53 (acknowledging that although a public auction is 
the surest way to satisfy Revlon, there are scenarios where that sort of transaction is not desirable 
and therefore a corporate board may want to elect some other method, such as a more limited pre-
signing market canvass, and thereafter discussing what transactions have been upheld by the 
Delaware courts).   
74See, e.g., In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 88 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing 
the complications that can arise in a multiple-bidder scenario, including access to proprietary 
information). 
75In fact, Chancellor Strine has suggested—as Vice Chancellor—that a corporation 
running a bidding process may even be "mandated" to adopt procedures to ensure the 
confidentiality of information and an "orderly auction."  Id. at 91.  However, former Chancellor, 
now Professor William T. Allen recently asked whether participation in a market canvass or full 
auction should be "conditioned on willingness to sign a [confidentiality agreement], standstill or 
bid procedures   letter . . . ."  Allen, supra note 21, at 52.  
76KLING & NUGENT, supra note 8, § 9.01, at 9-2 ("[T]he Buyer and the Seller ordinarily 
agree to enter into a confidentiality agreement which will establish the rules governing the      
Buyer's . . . examination and use of confidential information concerning the target Company.") 
(footnote omitted).       
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interests.77  Namely, the target wants to facilitate the bidder's ability to make 
a "full bid," but the target also wants to protect itself from the possible 
repercussions of key business information disclosure.78  Thus, 
confidentiality agreements have become "both standard and standardized" 
business practice in M&A transactions.79  Furthermore, as the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas notes, if confidentiality 
agreements could not be used and relied upon, "it could substantially disrupt 
the present process of negotiating and consummating business acquisitions 
and mergers."80  Often a key component of a confidentiality agreement, 
which assists the negotiation process in running smoothly, is a standstill.81 
Standstill agreements first surfaced "in the early 1980s," and appear 
to have been a direct answer to the hostile takeover activity prevalent during 
that period.82  They developed as a basic contract between a corporation and 
a substantial stockholder that limited the ability of the shareholder to 
acquire and gain ownership of shares up to a certain amount.83  
 
                                                                                                         
77Id.  
78Id. 
79See, e.g., David Marcus, The Case of Travis Laster, THE DEAL MAGAZINE, Mar. 25, 
2011, available at http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/038817/2011/the-case-of-travis-
laster.php (stating that the use of confidentiality agreements in the M&A context are "both 
standard and standardized").  
80Gen. Portland, Inc. v. LaFarge Coppee S.A., 1981 WL 1408, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 
1981). 
81See Lawlor, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that standstill agreements involving publicy 
owned companies are prevalent in the M&A context and characterizing them as "corporate peace 
treaties"). 
82See Subramanian, supra note 17, at 659 n.164; see also Lawlor, supra note 1, at 7 
(noting standstills have been used in M&A "for decades").  In his 2003 article, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of Takeover Defenses, Professor Guhan Subramanian noted outside of "technical 
discussions of standstill agreement mechanics in practitioner-oriented publications, . . . standstill 
agreements have been mentioned only in passing in the law review literature over the past ten 
years."  Subramanian, supra note 17, at 659 n.164.  In the same article, Professor Subramanian 
cited to three articles on standstills published in the 1980s:  Joseph W. Bartlett & Christopher B. 
Andrews, The Standstill Agreement: Legal and Business Considerations Underlying a Corporate 
Peace Treaty, 62 B.U. L. REV. 143 (1982); Larry Y. Dann & Harry DeAngelo, Standstill 
Agreements, Privately Negotiated Stock Repurchases, and the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. 
FIN. ECON. 275 (1983); and  Steven A. Baronoff, Note, The Standstill Agreement: A Case of 
Illegal Vote Selling and a Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 93 YALE L.J. 1093 (1984).  Subramanian, 
supra note 17, at 659 n.164.  Professor Subramanian dedicated a small portion of Bargaining in 
the Shadow of Takeover Defenses to standstills, focusing on the role they play in negotiations.  See 
id. at 659-62 (discussing standstills in the context of asymmetric information among bidders).  
However, I was unable to locate any other academic articles published since the three articles cited 
to by Professor Subramanian that provided a more in-depth analysis of standstills.  Hence, this 
Article is the first academic article devoted solely to standstills to be published since the 1980s, 
according to this Author's research.  
83See, e.g., Dann & DeAngelo, supra note 82, at 276 (discussing the early evolution of the 
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Toward the latter half of the 1980s, standstill agreements began to be 
used in friendly acquisitions, and usually in connection with a 
confidentiality agreement.84  Selling corporations in auctions and other pre-
signing bidding processes began to ask bidders to execute a standstill in 
exchange for access to the seller's due diligence materials.85  Today, most 
confidentiality agreements contain standstills or, if they do not, are 
accompanied by a standstill agreement separately executed as a stand-alone 
document.86  No matter the form in which they appear, standstills are de 
rigueur.87  For many target companies, a bidder's willingness to agree to a 
standstill in exchange for the provision of confidential, non-public 
information shows the target that the bidder is a serious one.88  A former co-
head of Global Mergers & Acquisitions at Lehman Brothers described 
standstills as "the cost of entry" into negotiations.89  Some have even 
suggested that only the biggest M&A players can avoid executing a 
                                                                                                         
standstill). 
84See Alan C. Stephenson, Auctions: Companies in Play and at Work, in 20TH ANNUAL 
INST. ON SEC. REGULATION, at 445 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Group, Course Handbook Series 
No. B4-6846, 1988) (noting in 1988 that companies in an auction "may require any bidders 
execute a confidentiality and standstill agreement prior to the seller's delivery of confidential 
financial information to a bidder"); see also E. Norman Veasey et al., The Delaware Business 
Judgment Rule: The Duty to Auction a Corporation and Lock-Ups in Contested Takeovers, in 
HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1989, at 336 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course 
Handbook Series No. B4-6869, 1989) (discussing Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., 1988 WL 
8772 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1988), reprinted in 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1273 (1988), where defendant, in 
its quest for a bidder, allowed potential bidders access to confidential information upon their 
signing of confidentiality and standstill agreements). 
85See sources cited supra note 84; Subramanian, supra note 17, at 659-60 (explaining the 
functions of a standstill in a negotiation setting, where the potential acquirer agrees not to 
"increase its stake in the target, conduct a proxy contest to replace the target's board, or make a 
tender offer for the target's stock without the approval of the target board, for a specified period of 
time . . . [and] [i]n exchange, the acquirer gains access to the target's internal documents . . . 
allow[ing] it to conduct due diligence"). 
86See Lawlor, supra note 1, at 7 (noting most confidentiality agreements contain a 
standstill provision).    
87See supra text accompanying note 1.  
88See Nicole E. Clark, Preliminary Agreements, in DOING DEALS 2009: UNDERSTANDING 
THE NUTS & BOLTS OF TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE, at 80-81 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course 
Handbook Series No. 18777, 2009) (stating that the standstill agreement is of "primary concern" to 
the target company because it strives to thwart the potential acquirer from creating any disruptions 
to the negotiations process); Meryl S. Rosenblatt, Letters of Intent and Exclusivity, Confidentiality 
and Standstill Agreements, in DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS 2004-2005, at 237 (PLI Corp. 
Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B0-01K0, 2004) ("[A] target may require a 
potential buyer to enter into a standstill at the outset of merger negotiations to ensure that the 
buyer remains committed to a friendly negotiated transaction and is prevented from pursuing a 
hostile alternative."). 
89Subramanian, supra note 17, at 660 (describing the understood expectation of a 
standstill agreement).   
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standstill.90  Wasserstein summarized the view of many sellers in the M&A 
field when he wrote, "[t]he willingness to sign a standstill . . . serves as a 
kind of litmus test, an indication of a bidder's true intentions."91  Essentially, 
the view among practitioners is that a potential buyer has a choice between 
preserving the right to bring a hostile transaction and foregoing that right by 
signing a standstill.92      
The exact terms of standstills vary depending on factual context and 
are anything but boilerplate.  Traditionally, standstill restrictions take the 
form of a combination of some or all of the following:  1) limitations on 
purchases of securities or assets of the target without the target's prior 
consent; 2) the solicitation of proxies to prevent the replacement of the 
target's management or from otherwise exercising control over 
management; and 3) making tender offers for the target's securities or 
making other unsolicited proposals for business combination transactions.93 
 More simply, these restrictions are used to further the goals of "avoiding 
disruption" in negotiations, to control the bidding process, and to act as deal 
protection devices against later overbids.94  To this end, although there are 
other situations in which a standstill may be used, this Article focuses on 
standstills executed "in connection with the exchange of confidential 
information as a prelude to a possible corporate combination."95 
 
                                                                                                         
90Id. ("As you might expect, the companies that can get away with [foregoing signing a 
standstill agreement] are the bigger gorillas in the jungle.") (quoting Interview by Guhan 
Subramanian with Stephen Munger, Co-Head of Global Mergers & Acquisitions, Morgan Stanley, 
in New York, N.Y. (June 3, 2003)).  
91WASSERSTEIN, supra note 70, at 689.   
92See, e.g., Subramanian, supra note 17, at 662 (describing inevitable judgment call 
buyers must make when asked to execute a standstill agreement).  A former Global Head of 
Mergers & Acquisitions at Bear Sterns best summarized the buyers' decision as:  
[Y]ou could preserve your flexibility to pursue a hostile deal, in which case you 
do not move forward with the bilateral discussions because the target is not 
willing to share confidential information with you unless you agree to the 
standstill.  Alternatively, you try to modify the standstill as much as you can, but 
fundamentally give up the basic ability to launch an unsolicited offer.  
Id. (quoting Interview by Guhan Subramanian with Louis P. Friedman, Former Global Head of 
Mergers & Acquisitions, Bear, Stearns & Co., in New York, N.Y. (June 2, 2003)).  
93Marla A. Hoehn, Letters of Intent, Confidentiality and Standstill Agreements, in 
DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS 2002-2003, at 78 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Handbook 
Series No. B0-01K0, 2002).   
94See id. at 79-80 (discussing how such protections facilitate smoother transactions); see 
also Robert E. Spatt & Peter Martelli, The Four Ring Circus-Round Fifteen; A Further Updated 
View of the Mating Dance Among Announced Merger Partners and an Unsolicited Second or 
Third Bidder, SIMPSON THATCHER & BARTLETT LLP 1, 35 (Mar. 17, 2011), 
http://www.stblaw.com/Four 
RingCircus2011.pdf (noting that the intended goal of standstills is to prevent deal jumping). 
95Kenneth J. Bialkin, The Use of Standstill Agreements in Corporate Transactions,            
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Alone, confidentiality agreements provide for a defense against 
hostile transactions because the "permitted uses and users" of confidential 
information in a confidentiality agreement generally do not include using 
such information to formulate a hostile offer.96  Thus, despite the importance 
of standstills, a standstill provision can be removed from the confidentiality 
agreement, yet the confidentiality agreement can still stand and provide 
protection in some cases.97  Conversely, a standstill provision can stand-
alone and bind the parties, even when neither party has exchanged 
confidential information with the other, following the execution of a 
confidentiality agreement.98  Thus, unless the agreement between the parties 
provides otherwise, a standstill will be effective as of the time of its 
execution.99 
Although both confidentiality agreements and standstills can stand 
alone, confidentiality agreements do not fulfill the evidentiary function that 
standstill agreements do in the context of a hostile takeover.100  More 
specifically, showing a violation of a standstill is easier than showing a 
violation of a confidentiality agreement.101  In fact, some commentators have 
stated that courts "may view the mere existence of a standstill as eviden[ce] 
of the parties' intentions not to proceed on an unfriendly basis."102  This may 
                                                                                                         
in THIRTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 1983, at 34 (PLI Corp. L. & 
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B2-1281, 1983).  
96Rosenblatt, supra note 88, at 231, 237.  Of particular significance is the recent Delaware 
Supreme Court case of Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 2012 WL 
2783101 (Del. July 10, 2012).  There, Martin Marietta and Vulcan entered into two confidentiality 
agreements, neither of which contained an explicit standstill provision.  Id. at *2, *7.  The 
confidentiality agreements "permitted either party to use the other party's Evaluation Material, but 
'solely for the purpose of evaluating a Transaction.'"  Id. at *2.  Further, "'Transaction' [was 
defined] as 'a possible business combination transaction . . . between [Martin] and [Vulcan] or one 
of their respective subsidiaries.'" Id.  The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Chancery's finding 
that a "possible business transaction between" the parties included only friendly, negotiated 
transactions.  Id. at *7, *10  Thus, Martin Marietta was prevented from using Vulcan's 
confidential information in a hostile takeover of Vulcan.  Id. at *56.  
97See KLING & NUGENT, supra note 8, § 9.05, at 9-18 ("The message is clear that by 
signing a confidentiality agreement, even without a standstill provision, a Buyer may be foregoing 
  its opportunity to proceed to acquire the Seller on any basis other than a friendly negotiated one 
in which the Seller will agree to the Buyer's disclosure of pertinent material information 
concerning   the Seller in the Buyer's possession.").  
98Aurizon Mines Ltd. v. Northgate Minerals Corp. (2006), 57 B.C.L.R. 4th 137, paras. 65-
66 (Can. B.C. S.C.), aff'd, 55 B.C.L.R. 4th 203 (Can. B.C. C.A.); see also Martin Marietta, 2012 
WL 2783101, at *8 ("Standstill prohibitions do not require, or in any way depend upon, a 
contracting party's use or disclosure of the other party's confidential, nonpublic information."). 
99Aurizon Mines Ltd., 57 B.C.L.R. 4th at para. 64. 
100See, e.g., Rosenblatt, supra note 88, at 237.  
101Id.  
102KLING & NUGENT, supra note 8, § 9.04, at 9-14.  
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account for one of the reasons these types of agreements have become so 
pervasive in the M&A realm. 
 Standstills usually span from one to five years, depending on factual 
context.103  Typically, a target wants the standstill to last until the sales 
process ends or as long as the bidder has material non-public information.104 
 Oftentimes, the bidder will demand the standstill expire either when a third 
party attempts to acquire the target, or upon the target's entry into an 
agreement with another party.105  Generally, "auction-style standstill 
agreements last only one or two years, on the basis that the confidential 
information to be provided to the bidders will have useful currency for only 
a relatively short time."106  Even shorter standstills with expirations between 
six months and one year are not uncommon; although, one year may be the 
norm.107  As a result of these lengths, most standstills executed during the 
pre-signing period will last beyond the target's signing of a definitive 
acquisition agreement with another acquirer or a "winning bidder."108  Thus, 
the standstill's interaction with provisions contained in the definitive merger 
agreement become of primary importance.    
C.  Fiduciary Outs & Their Correlation to Standstills 
Regardless of whether the target performs an auction or negotiates 
with only one bidder, the resulting merger agreement will be publicly 
 
                                                                                                         
103Rosenblatt, supra note 88, at 240.   
104Id. 
105Id. ("[A bidder may require the standstill] terminate . . . upon the filing of a Schedule 
13D by a third party disclosing an acquisition of a specified threshold percentage of the target's 
voting securities, upon commencement of a tender offer or a proxy contest for the election of 
directors, or the execution of an agreement to acquire the target or its assets.").   
106Lawlor, supra note 1, at 11. Some argue this one-to-two-year period may not be 
sufficient, depending on the type of information at issue.  For example, practitioner William 
Lawlor argues this period may be "woefully short if the target is conveying crown jewel 
information."  Id. 
107Subramanian, supra note 17, at 660 & n.165; see also The "Standstill Agreement" in Public 




n.pdf (participants at mock negotiation of standstill agreement stating between one year and  two 
years is a normal standstill length and stating six months is not likely helpful). If the standstill 
relates to a significant shareholder, however, even if said shareholder is known as an activist 
shareholder, those standstills can last from five to ten years or even longer.  Lawlor, supra note 1,  
 at 11. 
108 Lawlor, supra note 1, at 7. 
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announced within a day or two of execution.109  Once the agreement is 
publicly announced, there is a possibility that a third party may attempt to 
overbid.110  Recent statistics reveal that when third parties submit competing 
offers during the pre-closing period, about a third of those third party offers 
have been successful.111  But, even if the third party offer is unsuccessful, its 
mere presence tends to boost the price beyond the initial bid.112 
A public company merger agreement normally contains a number of 
deal protection devices to prevent, or at least deter such overbids, but chief 
among them is a no-shop provision paired with a fiduciary out.113  The no-
shop provision, or non-solicitation provision, prevents the target from 
soliciting offers between signing and closing.114  However, the fiduciary out 
allows a target's board of directors to negotiate with a third party who 
makes an unsolicited offer if the third party's offer is either a "Superior 
Offer," or if it is reasonably likely to become a "Superior Offer" as defined 
by the merger agreement.115  In addition, the termination provisions typically 
work hand-in-hand with the fiduciary out and permit the target company to 
terminate the existing agreement in favor of a third party offer if the board 
determines it would be a violation of its fiduciary duties not to do so.116  
Many times the fiduciary out or the termination fee triggers will require that 
the unsolicited offer be a bona fide one.117  In addition, this bona fide 
 
                                                                                                         
109Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, Do Termination Provisions Truncate the 
Takeover Bidding Process?, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 461, 475 (2007). 
110Bainbridge, supra note 31, at 16 ("Where the target's board accepts a low initial offer, a 
second bidder may succeed by offering shareholders a higher-priced alternative.").  
111Kelley D. Parker, Deal Protection and Deal Jumping: Lessons Learned From the 
Recent Past, in DOING DEALS 2011: THE ART OF M&A TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE, at 329 (PLI 
Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 28650, 2011) (stating in 2010 only three out 
of       ten deals involved a third party bidder successfully breaking up an initial transaction). 
112See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing an example of a case where an initial buyer increased 
its offer in the face of a third party overbid).   
113Sautter, supra note 33, at 72-73.   
114Id. ("[The no-shop] is a covenant preventing a target company from actively soliciting 
offers from third parties after the signing of a definitive acquisition agreement.").   
115Id. at 73. 
116Id.  The standard for terminating an existing agreement will vary depending on the 
language of the fiduciary out, which itself varies from deal-to-deal.  As an alternative to the 
"violation" language, some fiduciary outs require the action simply be "inconsistent" with the  
board's fiduciary duties.  Compare Sun Microsystems, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement 
(Schedule 14-A), § 6.03(b) (May 12, 2009) ("[T]he failure to take such action would be 
inconsistent with its fiduciary duties under Applicable Law.") (emphasis added), with NetLogic 
Microsystems, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger Reorganization (Form 8-K), § 6.9(a), Exhibit 
2.5 (June 4, 2009) (providing the target board may negotiate with or provide information to third 
parties upon the board's good faith determination, and failure to act without such a determination  
could result in a breach of fiduciary duties).   
117An example of a no-shop fiduciary out conditioning performance on the unsolicited   
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language is often found in the definition of "Superior Offer" or "Superior 
Proposal," which plays a key role in whether a board may engage in 
negotiations with a third party, provide information to a third party, and 
possibly terminate the agreement in favor of the third party offer.118  
Delaware courts have yet to interpret the meaning of "bona fide" in the 
context of a third party offer.  Accordingly, they have never addressed 
whether a third party offer made in contravention of a standstill could be a 
bona fide offer.  Part IV.A of this Article addresses how Delaware courts 
might resolve this unanswered question.    
                                                                                                         
offer being bona fide is as follows: 
[O]nly until the Requisite Company Vote is obtained, the Company and its board 
of directors shall be permitted to: 
(i) (A) engage in discussions and negotiations with a Person who has 
made a bona fide unsolicited Company Takeover Proposal and (B) furnish or 
disclose any non-public information relating to the Company. . . , in each case if 
the board of directors of the Company determines in good faith, after 
consultation with the Company Financial Advisor, that such Company Takeover 
Proposal could reasonably be expected to lead to a Superior Proposal .  .  .  . 
SiRF Tech. Holdings, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Form 8-K) § 5.4(d), Exhibit 2.1 (Feb. 
10, 2009) (emphasis added).  In addition, an example of a termination fee trigger containing bona 
fide language is contained in HeartWare International, Inc.’s agreement to be acquired by 
Thoratec Corporation.  That provision states: 
(iv) If this Agreement is terminated [because stockholder approval was not 
obtained then] . . . in the event that, (A) at any time after the date of this 
Agreement and prior to such termination any Third Party shall have publicly   
made, proposed, communicated or disclosed an intention to make a bona fide 
Acquisition Proposal, which bona fide Acquisition Proposal was not retracted or 
rescinded prior to such termination and (B) within twelve (12) months of the 
termination of this Agreement, the Company . . . enters into a definitive 
agreement with respect to an Acquisition 
Proposal . . . the Company shall pay . . . the Company Termination Fee, such 
payment to be made upon the earlier to occur of the execution of a definitive 
agreement relating to, or consummation of, such Acquisition Proposal. 
HeartWare Int'l, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Form 8-K) § 8.03(a)(iv), Exhibit 2.1 (Feb. 
13, 2009) (emphasis added).  
118An example of bona fide language appearing in a Superior Proposal definition is 
present in SiRF Technology Holdings, Inc.'s merger agreement, which provides: 
 "Superior Proposal" means any bona fide written Company Takeover 
Proposal . . . which the board of directors . . . determines in good faith (after 
consultation with its legal counsel and the Company Financial Advisor) to be 
more favorable to the stockholders of the Company from a financial point of 
view than the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, taking into 
consideration the conditions to the consummation of such Company Takeover 
Proposal and the financial, legal, regulatory and other aspects of such Company 
Takeover Proposal. 
SiRF Tech. Holdings, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Form 8-K) § 8.1(y), Exhibit 2.1 (Feb. 
10, 2009) (second emphasis added).  
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III.  STANDSTILLS IN ACTION 
A limited number of cases have examined the validity of standstills in 
the sales process.119  Courts that do take on the issue tend to address 
standstills as a part of the larger sales process, so that the validity or the 
alleged improper use of a standstill is usually only one of multiple 
challenges the court is addressing.120  Thus, few cases have addressed 
standstills at length.121  Courts have upheld a target's decision to have 
potential bidders execute a standstill as a precondition to obtaining access to 
confidential information, even when the deal results in a change of control 
and heightened scrutiny is applicable.122 
A.  Topping Bids in Contravention of a Standstill 
The Delaware courts have never addressed a target board's actions in 
the wake of a topping bid that violates an existing standstill.  A few other 
U.S. courts, as well as Canadian courts, have confronted the issue.123  This 
section explores those cases as well as other overbids made in contravention 
of a standstill that went unlitigated.         
1.  The Importance of Contract Language and Bona Fide Offers 
HCP, Inc. and Ventas, Inc.'s battle124 for Sunrise REIT (hereinafter 
"Sunrise") illustrates a number of issues relating to standstills, including the 
requirement that a superior offer be bona fide and the promise not to grant a 
standstill waiver.125  This contest began in late 2006, when Sunrise, a 
Canadian real estate investment trust whose units are traded on the Toronto 
 
                                                                                                         
119See City Capital Assocs. L.P. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 803 n.21 (Del. Ch. 1988) 
("These [standstill] agreements which always play an important role . . . rarely get litigated."). 
120Id. (remarking that the standstill is only one of several documents pertinent to a court's 
investigation into the matter at hand). 
121See e.g., id. (noting that courts often tend to side-step extensive discussion of standstill 
agreements in favor of focusing on other aspects of the deal).  
122See Rosenblatt, supra note 88, at 241 ("[T]he validity of the standstill will be subject to 
heightened scrutiny but will likely be upheld so long as it is part of a good faith overall strategy to 
maximize shareholder value.").   
123E.g., Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc., 647 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 2011); Ventas, Inc. v. Sunrise 
Senior Living Real Estate Inv. Trust (2007), 85 O.R. 3d 254 (Can. Ont. C.A.).  
124Ventas, 647 F.3d at 297-303 (recounting the contentious record between the two  
bidders).  
125Id. at 321.  
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Stock Exchange, "conducted a confidential auction of its assets."126  The 
auction was designed as a two-stage process with the goal of maximizing 
the value received for the units.127  The first stage of the auction provided 
several possible buyers the opportunity to submit non-binding bids.128  
Sunrise then narrowed the field based on the non-binding bids, and allowed 
those participants to submit final bids for the second round.129  As a part of 
the second stage of the auction, seven parties, including HCP and Ventas, 
executed confidentiality agreements containing a standstill provision.130  
HCP's standstill prevented it from making an offer to purchase the stock or 
assets of Sunrise for eighteen months without Sunrise's prior written 
consent.131  Also as part of the standstill, HCP agreed not to request that 
Sunrise waive any portion of it.132  The Ventas confidentiality agreement 
was substantially the same as HCP's, and also included a standstill.133  But 
Ventas' standstill "ceased to apply if, amongst other things, Sunrise REIT 
entered into an agreement to sell more than 20% of its units or assets to a 
third party."134  Neither HCP nor Ventas were parties to the other's 
confidentiality agreements.135  With respect to waivers of the conditions 
contained in the confidentiality agreements, including presumably the 
standstill provision, the confidentiality agreements contained the following 
provision:  "No provision of this agreement can be waived except by means 
of a written instrument that is validly executed on behalf of the party hereto 
granting the waiver and that refers specifically to the particular provision or 
provisions being waived."136   
The bids submitted during the first stage of the auction were 
conditioned on reaching an agreement with Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. 
(SSL), a company that managed Sunrise's real estate.137  Sunrise invited both 
HCP and Ventas to participate as the only bidders in the second stage of the 
 
                                                                                                         
126Id. at 297; see also Ventas, 85 O.R. 3d at para. 1 (stating Sunrise units were traded on  
the Toronto Stock Exchange). 
127Ventas, 85 O.R. 3d at para. 2. 
128Ventas, 647 F.3d at 297. 
129Id.  
130Ventas Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Investment Trust (2007), 29 B.L.R. 4th 
292, para. 4 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).   
131Id. at para. 5.   
132Id. 
133Id. at paras. 5-6. 
134Id. 
135 Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc., 647 F.3d 291, 297 (6th Cir. 2011). 
136Ventas, 29 B.L.R. 4th at para. 5.   
137Ventas, 647 F.3d at 297. 
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auction.138  At this point, the problems seemed to begin.  Ventas was able to 
reach an agreement with SSL, but HCP's negotiations with SSL "'blew up'" 
when another real estate portfolio that HCP owned but SSL managed 
"became intertwined in the Sunrise negotiations."139  HCP did not submit a 
final bid for Sunrise and withdrew from the auction.140  Ventas won the 
auction, agreeing to pay $15 per unit, or over $1.1 billion, pursuant to the 
Purchase Agreement announced on January 15, 2007.141  The $15 figure 
represented a 50% premium over Sunrise's trading price prior to the deal 
announcement.142   
The Sunrise-Ventas purchase agreement contained a no-shop 
provision preventing Sunrise from actively soliciting third party offers and 
from negotiating with or holding discussions with third parties regarding an 
actual or potential offer.143  That provision was also paired with a fiduciary 
out for "Superior Proposals," a matching rights period of five business days, 
and a termination fee of $398 million.144  Under the terms of the agreement, 
"Superior Proposal" meant "any unsolicited bona fide written Acquisition 
Proposal."145  Moreover, the non-solicitation provision contained an anti-
waiver clause that specifically stated Sunrise could not "release any Person 
from, or fail to enforce, any confidentiality or standstill agreement or 
similar obligations to Sunrise REIT or any of its Subsidiaries."146 
Despite the non-solicitation provision, Sunrise's CEO "suggested to 
HCP['s] CEO . . . via email that HCP make a bid for Sunrise."147  On 
 
                                                                                                         
138Id.  This invitation was based on the preliminary bids that HCP and Ventas submitted 
during the first stage of the auction, in which HCP's preliminary bid was for $16.25 per unit and 
Ventas offered $13.25 per unit (both dollar amounts are in Canadian dollars).  Id. & n.2.  
Hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, for the purposes of the Sunrise discussion, all dollar figures 
represent Canadian dollars. 
139Ventas, 647 F.3d at 297-98.  At trial in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Kentucky, the parties could not agree as to who was at fault for the breakdown in 
negotiations.  Id. at 298.  On the one side, HCP argued that it had actually reached an agreement 
the week of January 8, 2007 with SSL, but then SSL "demanded 'concessions in separate 
negotiations concerning other properties.'"  Id.  From the other end, Ventas argued that the 
negotiations broke down because HCP was not acting in good faith and that HCP had submitted a 
counter-proposal to SSL at 8 p.m. the night before the final bid deadline containing "substantially 
different terms than [what] the parties had previously discussed." Id.   
140Ventas, 647 F.3d at 298. 
141Id. at 298-99. 
142Id. at 299. 
143Ventas Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Inv. Trust (2007), 29 B.L.R. 4th 292, 
para. 13 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
144Id. at paras. 13-15. 
145Id. at para. 14. 
146Id. at para. 13.  
147Ventas, 647 F.3d at 299.  
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February 14, 2007, HCP's CEO informed Sunrise's financial advisor that 
HCP was prepared to make an offer of $18 per unit.148  HCP sent a letter to 
Sunrise including the details of its offer, as well as an unconditional but 
unsigned purchase agreement.149  Although Sunrise requested that HCP not 
go public with its offer, HCP issued a press release announcing the offer.150  
The press release included a copy of the offer letter that HCP had sent to 
Sunrise, which contained a statement that it was "confident" that it would be 
able to reach an agreement "'with [SSL] on terms comparable to those 
entered into by Ventas.'"151  However, after issuing the press release, HCP 
told Sunrise that reaching a deal with SSL was actually a condition of its 
offer.152  On February 15, 2007, Sunrise's stock price increased to above $18 
per unit despite a pre-market opening announcement by Sunrise that it 
would not consider HCP's offer "until 'such time as it receives a 
confirmation from HCP that their proposal is not conditional on [HCP] 
reaching an agreement with [SSL].'"153     
Over the next seven days, Sunrise issued a number of press releases, 
including one referencing that HCP indicated it was ready to enter into an 
agreement with SSL that was "substantially similar" to the Ventas-SSL 
agreement.154  This prompted Ventas to issue a press release on February 22, 
2007 stating "that HCP's offer was barred by the Standstill Agreement, and 
was a conditional offer that was in fact less favorable than its own."155  Also 
during this period, litigation involving the standstill agreement began.156  
First, on February 19, 2007, Sunrise filed an application in the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice seeking a declaration clarifying whether HCP was 
allowed to negotiate with SSL.157  On February 21, 2007, Ventas filed an 
application in the Ontario Superior Court "seeking a declaration that Sunrise 
was obligated to enforce its Standstill Agreement with HCP."158  
Sunrise, Ventas, and HCP raised a number of arguments in support of 
their claims.159 Sunrise argued that it had contracted for a fiduciary out in an 
 
                                                                                                         
148Id.  
149Id. 
150Id. at 299-300 (quoting HCP's press release announcing its proposal to acquire Sunrise).  
151Ventas, 647 F.3d at 300. 
152Id.  
153Id. (noting that Feburary 15, 2007 was "the largest trading day in the history of 
Sunrise").  
154Id.  
155Ventas, 647 F.3d at 300. 
156Id. at 301. 
157Id. 
158Id.  
159See Ventas Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Inv. Trust (2007), 29 B.L.R. 4th 
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attempt to maximize value for its unitholders.160  Sunrise argued that Ventas' 
benefits from winning the auction were the matching rights and the $38 
million termination fee.161  Sunrise also argued that under the fiduciary out it 
"should be able to determine whether an Acquisition Proposal could be a 
Superior Proposal without being required to enforce a standstill 
provision."162 It contended that, if Ventas wanted to prohibit a certain person 
who had taken part in the auction from submitting an offer, Ventas should 
have used "express language to do so."163  HCP raised similar contentions as 
Sunrise but additionally argued that the no-shop and related fiduciary out 
did not prevent persons engaged in the auction process from making an 
offer.164  HCP argued its offer was not made in violation of the no-shop 
provision as its offer was "unsolicited, and bona fide."165   
Ventas took the opposite position to Sunrise and HCP.166  It argued 
the standstill agreement had been entered into as part of the rules of the 
auction process, and one of the benefits of playing by the auction rules and 
winning was that Sunrise had a "binding obligation" to enforce HCP's 
standstill.167  Ventas contended HCP's offer did not satisfy the requirements 
to trigger the fiduciary out provisions because the offer "w[as] not 
unsolicited or bona fide."168  Ventas argued Sunrise and HCP should be held 
to their bargained-for contracts and that "[t]he rationale for deal protection 
devices such as the Standstill Agreement . . . is that, in a contested bidding 
situation, they encourage bidders to make their best bids."169 
On March 6, 2007, the Ontario Superior Court issued its judgment 
ruling in favor of Ventas' application.170  The court focused on the language 
of the non-solicitation provision and determined that Sunrise's promise not 
to waive the standstill agreement was unambiguous and express under the 
purchase agreement.171  The court stated that "[b]ona fide means acting or 
done in good faith; sincere, genuine."172  As a result, the court concluded 
that an offer made in violation of a "contractual obligation not to make such 
                                                                                                         
292, paras. 25-28 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
160Id. at para. 26. 
161Id. (characterizing the benefits received by Ventas as "significant").  
162Id. 
163Ventas, 29 B.L.R. 4th at para. 26. 
164Id. at para. 27. 
165Id.  
166See id. at paras. 25-27. 
167Ventas, 29 B.L.R. 4th at para. 25.   
168Id.  
169Id.  
170Id. at para. 46. 
171Ventas, 29 B.L.R. 4th at para. 35. 
172Id. at para. 37 (citing THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 379 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d. 
ed. 2007)).   
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a proposal [could not] be considered . . . bona fide."173  The court 
additionally stated the no-shop provision required that the third party offer 
not be made in violation of that particular provision174 and further, HCP's 
offer had violated the no-shop because it was made in violation of the 
standstill.175  The court also found that the "clear scheme" of the purchase 
agreement was to enforce standstills entered into during the auction.176  This 
agreement, the court noted, "was a form of protection afforded to the 
purchaser, Ventas," and was "part of the package negotiated" between the 
parties.177   
Less than three weeks after the Ontario Superior Court's decision, the 
Court of Appeal for Ontario affirmed.178  Holding that the Sunrise-Ventas 
Purchase Agreement bound Sunrise to enforce the HCP standstill,179 the 
court also affirmed the lower court's finding that HCP's proposal was not 
bona fide.180  While the appellate decision delved into further detail, the 
Court of Appeal's analysis can be summarized as a rejection of both of 
Sunrise's assertions through relying on and heavily citing to the reasoning 
set forth in the Superior Court decision.181  
Pertinent to this article is one particular point from the Court of 
Appeal for Ontario.  HCP attempted to argue that, because the trial judge 
had neglected the importance of the trustees' fiduciary duty to maximize 
unitholder value, the trial judge had also failed to interpret the contract in a 
way "that accords with sound commercial sense."182  HCP further urged that 
fiduciary outs should ensure that the trustees are able to consider other 
offers—even those submitted after Sunrise entered into a purchase 
agreement—that are potentially more favorable.183  Interestingly, not only 
did the court reject HCP's argument, the analysis expressly stated: 
 
                                                                                                         
173Id. 
174Id. 
175Ventas, 29 B.L.R. (4th) at paras. 37-38. 
176Id. at 38.  
177Id. 
178Ventas Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Inv. Trust (2007), 85 O.R. 3d 254,   
para. 7 (Ca. Ont. C.A.).  
179Id. at paras. 34-35 ("Sunrise's obligation to enforce its Standstill Agreements with third 
parties is not negated by the fiduciary out clause . . . .  The fiduciary out clause does not apply 
where the unsolicited proposal is tendered in breach of the non-solicitation provisions of the 
Purchase Agreement, i.e., in breach of a Standstill Agreement that Sunrise is obliged to enforce."). 
180Id. at paras. 59-61.  
181See id. at paras. 27-28, 35, 42, 48, 50-52, 60-61, 63-64 (agreeing with and defending the 
lower court’s findings). 
182Ventas, 85 O.R. (3d) 254 at para. 51. 
183Id. at paras. 53 ("[HCP] placed great emphasis on the sanctity of the fiduciary out 
mechanism in acquisition agreements of this nature.").  
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It is not necessary – nor would it be wise, in my view – to go 
as far as HCP[] suggests this court might go, and adopt the 
principle gleaned from some American authorities, that the 
target vendor can place no limits on the directors' right to 
consider superior offers and that any provision to the contrary 
is invalid and unenforceable: see Paramount Communications 
Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994), and ACE 
Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999), at p. 
105.  That is not what happened in this case.184 
The appellate court found that Sunrise's trustees did not breach their 
fiduciary duty by agreeing to a contract restricting their ability to receive 
offers submitted by third parties who had executed standstills.185  
Prior to the Court of Appeals of Ontario decision, Ventas contacted 
Sunrise, waiving the right under the Purchase Agreement to force the March 
31, 2007 meeting of Sunrise's unitholders.186  On April 11, Ventas submitted 
an increased offer of $16.50 "to salvage the deal and avoid injury to its 
reputation"; on April 19, the unitholders approved the offer.187  Finally, on 
April 26, 2007, Sunrise and Ventas closed a deal.188  Following the deal, 
Ventas commenced separate proceedings in the United States federal court 
system on May 3, 2007.189  In the proceedings that followed, over two years 
lapsed before the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Kentucky ultimately found that HCP had tortiously interfered with Ventas' 
expectancies under the Sunrise-Ventas agreement.190  On May 17, 2011, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided that just over a 
 
                                                                                                         
184Id. at para. 54. 
185Id. at para. 55. 
186Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc., 647 F.3d 291, 327 (6th Cir. 2011). 
187Id. at 301. Separately, the District Court detailed the circumstances surrounding this 
price increase as follows: 
HCP's announcement had also caused the trading price to increase, resulting in a 
new composition of unitholders.  Following the Canadian litigation, Ventas sued 
Sunrise REIT for breach of contract based on Sunrise REIT’s actions regarding 
HCP’s interference. Through proxy voting, Ventas saw that the unitholders were 
overwhelmingly opposing its bid.  During this time, Ventas and Sunrise REIT 
came to a resolution in their lawsuit that allowed Ventas to submit a bid for 
$16.50 with the support of the Sunrise REIT board.  
Ventas, Inc. v. Health Care Prop. Investors, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 2d 612, 626 (W.D. Ky. 2009) 
(footnote omitted). 
188Ventas, 647 F.3d at 301. 
189Id. 
190Id. at 301-03.  
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$101 million award of compensatory damages was appropriate.191  
Undoubtedly, the monetary value at stake had influenced both HCP and 
Ventas, spurring each party onward throughout the course of the extensive 
litigation process.192  
In the context of this Article, two points of the tortious interference 
analysis are particularly pertinent.  First, the courts’ tortious interference 
analysis inquired into whether HCP intentionally interfered with Ventas's 
prospective business advantage.193  Second, the court looked to whether 
HCP acted with improper motive and, more importantly, whether HCP was 
acting in good faith.194  Because the issues of intent and good faith both 
relate to whether HCP's offer was bona fide, a few particular portions of the 
U.S. decisions seem noteworthy here. 
In the first instance, evidence before the U.S. courts revealed a 
considerable amount of information proving HCP's intent to interfere—
including a quote from one of HCP's investment bankers who apparently 
told his colleagues that, while HCP was still interested in acquiring Sunrise 
at the time they made the bid, "at a minimum, they plan[ned] on causing the 
other side to have to pay more."195  Not only did this evidence support 
findings of tortious interference, it also provided further support for the 
conclusion that the HCP offer was not bona fide.196 
Along those same lines, the aftermath that ensued after HCP's overbid 
also illustrates how a third party's contravention of a standstill can have 
severe consequences for the initial buyer.197  Possibly the most glaring 
consequence in this case is highlighted by the jury's finding that HCP's 
improper interference prevented Ventas from successfully acquiring the 
target company for $15 per unit.198   
 
                                                                                                         
191Id. at 318. 
192See Davidoff, supra note 22 (attributing this value as a possible explanation for why the 
parties had not settled,  at least as of 2009, stating, "[a] $101 million verdict may just be HCP's 
price of doing business"). 
193Ventas, 647 F.3d at 306-07.  
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between HCP's overbid and Ventas's failure to acquire Sunrise at $15 per unit 
price).  Additionally, Ventas alleged HCP caused its delay in dispensing units of stock that would 
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While the end result is that Sunrise's unitholders got more value for 
their respective units, the process used does not serve as an example of the 
procedural norm for the auction process.  Although HCP's violation of the 
standstill agreement was not outcome determinative for purposes of the 
tortious inference case, that case, along with the Canadian proceedings, 
demonstrate why winners of auctions favor standstills.199  At the same time, 
HCP's violation reveals there may be deals in which a target's shareholders 
could obtain additional value in a sale of control.  Thus, the case displays 
the tension that standstills attempt to alleviate, more specifically, the desire 
of an auction winner to protect its executed transaction from being 
"jumped" and the desire of stockholders to obtain the highest price possible 
in a sale of control.  
2.  The Role of the Target in Responding to an Overbid 
The Northrop Corporation ("Northrop") and Martin Marietta 
("Marietta") fight for Grumman Corporation ("Grumman") further 
illustrates the interplay of standstill provisions, fiduciary duties, and good 
faith.  This example shows that when a bidder appears to violate a standstill 
in the absence of bad faith—or at least when the bad faith occurs on the 
other side of the table—the validity of the standstill becomes questionable.  
When Northrop overbid, in violation of its standstill agreement with 
Grumman, it took the position that the standstill was unenforceable due to 
Grumman's failure to negotiate in good faith.200  While still negotiating with 
Northrop, Grumman rushed to enter into an agreement with Marietta 
without encouraging Northrop to submit a bid or even notifying Northrop 
that it was negotiating with Marietta.201  
                                                                                                         
jury arrived at a reasonable conclusion regarding the element of causation.  The jury had sufficient 
evidence to find that HCP's 'improper interference' caused injury to Ventas.").  
199Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP partner, Paul Kingsley, has been quoted as saying, 
"I have on occasion heard bankers – not lawyers – say that standstills   need not 
necessarily be respected because there are no damages to the target company  or 
its shareholders from receiving a higher bid.  That may be true, but that ignores, 
of course, circumstances like these in which the competing bidder – and auction 
winner – ended up having to shell out an extra $100 million plus to get its deal 
done."   
David Marcus, When Standstills Matter, THE DEAL MAGAZINE (Jan. 8, 2010),        
available at http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/032789/insights/safe-harbor/when-
standstills-matter.php.    
200Northrop Grumman Sys. Corp., Offer to Purchase (Schedule14-D1), Exhibit 99.A1,      
§§ 13, 15 (Mar. 14, 1994). 
201See id. § 13.  
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On January 21, 1993, Northrop and Grumman entered into a 
confidentiality agreement with a standstill provision.202  The standstill 
provided that each party agreed, unless specifically invited by the other, not 
to seek to acquire any securities of the other party or seek to effectuate any 
extraordinary transactions for a period of three years from the date of the 
letter.203  The provision further provided that neither party would seek a 
waiver, directly or indirectly, under any provision of the standstill 
agreement.204  The companies exchanged confidential information, but no 
serious discussions occurred.205  In the fall of 1993, Northrop re-initiated 
discussions.206 On January 19, 1994, Northrop forwarded a request for a 
thirty-day exclusivity period to engage in discussions.207  Grumman declined 
the offer, but discussions continued between the two companies with 
Grumman telling Northrop that any transaction should involve a significant 
portion of cash consideration.208  Northrop responded, indicating a 
preference for a transaction that minimized the amount of cash 
consideration.209 
In early February 1994, Grumman reached out to Marietta.210  
Marietta stated it did not want to participate in an auction process, and 
would only negotiate on an exclusive basis.211  The companies entered into a 
confidentiality agreement and standstill provision, similar to the one entered 
into between Grumman and Northrop, except the agreement only provided 
that neither party would publicly seek or publicly disclose a request for a 
waiver under the standstill provision.212  Marietta indicated it would be able 
to go forward with a cash transaction maximizing value to Grumman's 
shareholders.213  On February 17, Grumman's Board met and determined 
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that it was not interested in pursuing a transaction with Northrop.214  
Grumman informed Marietta that it would agree to exclusive negotiations, 
but noted that "time was of the essence."215  
On February 21, Marietta sent a letter that included an offer of $55 
cash per share with the condition that negotiations proceed on an exclusive 
basis.216  Grumman's Board authorized continued negotiations on the 
following understandings, based on Marietta's letter: a price of $55 per 
share, "until [Grumman] tells [Marietta] that the Company no longer wishes 
to continue discussions, [Grumman] does not intend to engage in 
discussions with another party regarding a business combination or invite or 
solicit such a transaction," and with respect to certain other terms of the 
letter, that the Board was only prepared to do what was "reasonable and 
consistent with the Board's fiduciary obligations."217  
On February 24, Northrop communicated to Grumman they would be 
prepared to submit an offer of not less than $50 a share.218  The following 
day, Northrop sent a letter further stating it would be prepared to submit a 
higher offer if Grumman would provide further information or analysis.219  
On February 28, Grumman's Board considered Northrop's letter and the 
possible effects that pursuing discussions would have on Marietta's offer.220  
Grumman determined not to pursue Northrop's letter after it was advised 
that Marietta's offer would likely produce a higher value under current 
market conditions.221  Several days later, Grumman approved and executed 
the merger with Marietta.222  
The merger agreement between Grumman and Marietta contained a 
no-shop paired with a fiduciary out, as well as a $50 million termination fee 
payable to Marietta in the event that Grumman terminated the agreement in 
favor of a third party's unsolicited overbid.223  The confidentiality agreement 
between Grumman and Northrop contained a standstill provision 
prohibiting Northrop from making any offer for a period of three years, 
unless specifically invited by Grumman.224  By the terms of the merger 
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agreement, Grumman could not solicit an offer from Northrop, and by the 
terms of the confidentiality agreement Northrop could not make an offer to 
Grumman.225  Northrop commenced a tender offer, taking the position that 
the standstill provision of the confidentiality agreement was 
unenforceable.226  
In a publicly filed letter accompanying the tender offer, the Chairman 
of Northrop complained that his company was not on a "level playing 
field."227  Northrop was unaware Grumman was negotiating with another 
company based on Grumman's repeated assurances that it was "not for 
sale."228  The letter asked why Northrop was not invited to submit an offer 
during negotiations while a request was made specifically to Marietta.229  
The Chairman pointed out that Northrop was not allowed the same 
confidential information as Marietta to complete its due diligence in order 
to refine its offer and additionally criticized the "lock up agreement" with 
Marietta as "improper and illegal."230 
In response to the letter, Northrop was provided with the same non-
public information that had been furnished to Marietta.231  Marietta 
attempted to force Grumman to enforce the provisions of the standstill, but 
Grumman refused.232  In a letter to the Chairman of Marietta, the Chairman 
of Grumman responded "in order to have a court enforce the Confidentiality 
Agreement's standstill provisions . . . it would be necessary to demonstrate 
the manner in which Grumman would be damaged if such standstill 
provisions were not enforced and, to secure injunctive relief, to demonstrate 
irreparable injury to Grumman."233  He then invited Marietta's counsel to 
discuss the matter with Grumman's counsel.234  Grumman proceeded to 
invite both companies to submit their highest bids.235  Without any further 
protest or an upward bid revision from Marietta, Grumman paid the $50 
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231See Grumman Corp., Amended Tender Offer Statement (Schedule 14-D1/A), Exhibit 
99.C3 (Mar. 15, 1994). 
232See Grumman Corp., Amended Solicitation, Recommendation Statements (Schedule 
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233Id. at Exhibit 99.C21.  
234Id.; see also Grumman Corp., Amended Tender Offer Statement (Schedule 14D-1/A),   
 at 2 (Apr. 5, 1994) (confirming Grumman paid the $50 million termination fee). 
235Grumman Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 8 (May 3, 1994). 
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million termination fee and additional reimbursement expenses followed by 
acceptance of Northrop's offer.236  Although this was a successful overbid in 
spite of a standstill provision, whether the standstill was actually 
enforceable (or used properly) is the $50 million dollar question.  
3.  Using a Standstill to Favor Board Members' Individual Interests 
The story behind the Formation Capital Partners (“Formation”) and 
Genesis Healthcare ("Genesis") merger tells a familiar story but raises 
different issues.  Arguably, Genesis' board improperly entered into an 
agreement with Formation when another bidder, Fillmore Capital Partners 
("Fillmore"), was present during a sales process that seemed to disregard 
shareholder value maximization and favor Formation.237  When the Fillmore 
proposal was deemed to be more favorable, Genesis' board requested that 
Formation revise its proposal without asking Fillmore to do the same.238  
When it appeared the agreement would not be approved by Genesis' 
shareholders, Formation agreed to reduce the termination fee and to allow 
Genesis to release Fillmore from its standstill obligation.239  After allowing 
Fillmore to continue to submit bids, Genesis then agreed to an increase in 
the termination fee to an amount near the original fee, further showing 
Genesis' preference to Formation.240  
In November 2006, Genesis formed a special committee to 
commence a non-public solicitation process.241  In early November, fourteen 
potential strategic and financial buyers were contacted, and several executed 
confidentiality and standstill agreements.242  Fillmore and Genesis entered 
into a standstill agreement on November 15, 2006.243  On December 1, 
Fillmore submitted an indication of interest to Genesis, suggesting it would 
be interested in retaining Genesis' senior management.244  On December 6, 
 
                                                                                                         
236Grumman Corp., Amended Tender Offer Statement, (Schedule 14-D1/A), Exhibit 
99.A11 (Apr. 5, 1994).  
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238Id. at 21.  
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Enterprises, Inc.  See Spatt & Martelli, supra note 94, at 6.  
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Formation Capital also submitted an indication of interest, revealing its 
intent to retain existing management.245  The next week, Mr. Hager, Genesis' 
Chairman and CEO, informed Fillmore that he would not agree to work for 
their organization.246  Fillmore's reply indicated that this decision would not 
discourage them from submitting a bid.247 
Genesis received final proposals from both companies pursuant to the 
solicitation process on January 11 and 12.248  Formation submitted an offer 
at $60 per share, while Fillmore's offer was $61 per share.249  Genesis later 
stated the Fillmore offer proposed transaction agreements and financing 
commitments raised fewer issues than those of Formation, but the terms still 
required additional negotiation.250  Genesis' board decided none of the 
bidders had distinguished themselves as the “clear winner,” and requested 
revised bids.251  Formation increased its bid to $62.50 per share, while 
Fillmore increased its offer to $63 per share.252  Both offers included 
substantial improvements in regard to transaction agreements and financing 
commitments.253  
At a meeting on January 15, Genesis' board was advised that the 
Fillmore offer was more favorable to the company's shareholders, and 
additionally suggested less risk of non-consummation compared with 
Formation's offer.254  Mr. Hager, along with another executive, reiterated 
their unwillingness to work for Fillmore.255  The non-executive directors 
were aware that Formation informed senior management of opportunities to 
own and run an independent company, though Formation had not disclosed 
any specific terms to the board or senior management.256 
The special committee determined that entering into a transaction 
with either company would be in the best interests of Genesis.257  After 
being contacted, Formation orally confirmed it would address open contract 
and financing issues and then raised its bid to $63 per share.258  Immediately 
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afterward, the board of directors approved the merger agreement with 
Formation.259  The merger agreement was subsequently announced the 
following morning.260 
After a few months of shareholders publicly voicing disapproval of 
the process, Genesis stated it appeared unlikely the merger would be 
approved by shareholders based on a preliminary vote tally of proxies and 
communications with them.261  On April 19, Genesis and Formation 
amended the merger agreement to increase the price to $64.25 per share, 
reduced the termination fee payable by Genesis to $15 million from $50 
million, and permitted Genesis to release other parties, including Fillmore, 
from their standstill obligations.262 
Then, in reliance on the waiver, Fillmore sent a proposal to acquire 
Genesis for $64.75 on April 24.263  Fillmore and Formation continued 
outbidding one another until Fillmore finally withdrew following Genesis' 
acceptance of Formation's $69.35 offer, which included an increase in the 
termination fee to $40 million.264  The CEO of Fillmore complained that 
there was not a level playing field, describing the process as "skewed and 
unfair," and called for "the Genesis Board to end the process yet again 
before its natural conclusion does not serve the interests of the Genesis 
shareholders."265  
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While Formation agreed to the release, this story nevertheless 
presents several questions pertinent to this Article.  For example, what if 
Formation did not agree to release Fillmore from its obligation?  What if 
there had been no waiver of that obligation, and Fillmore had made a bid in 
contravention of its standstill agreement?  Would the lack of Formation's 
consent have required Genesis to uphold the standstill?  In other words, 
would the standstill be enforceable in courts, despite the questionable 
manner in which the Genesis board favored Formation?   
B.  Target Board's Waiver of a Standstill 
1.  A Board's Refusal to Waive a Standstill 
The Delaware Court of Chancery has most often examined standstills 
to determine whether the seller was using the provision for an inequitable 
purpose such as favoring one bidder over another, or favoring one bidder 
over the shareholders' interests.266  The court made clear in In re Topps 
Shareholders Litigation267 that a target company may not refuse to waive a 
standstill to "favor one bidder over another."268   
In Topps, the target company, Topps Company, Inc. ("Topps"), 
entered into a merger agreement with a Michael Eisner-affiliated private 
equity firm ("Eisner").269  The Topps merger agreement contained a go-shop 
provision270 allowing Topps to actively shop the company for forty days 
following the execution of the merger agreement.271  During the go-shop 
period, the Upper Deck Company ("Upper Deck")—Topps’ prime 
competitor—expressed interest in Topps and "sought access to confidential 
information."272  Before providing Upper Deck with access to its 
confidential information, Topps required Upper Deck to execute a 
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confidentiality agreement containing a standstill provision.273  In particular, 
the standstill provision prevented Upper Deck from making "any public 
disclosure[s] with respect to any proposed transaction between Upper Deck 
and Topps," from disclosing that it was obtaining confidential information, 
and from making known that it had executed a standstill.274  Additionally, 
under the standstill, "Upper Deck agreed for a period of two years not to 
acquire or offer to acquire any of Topps's common stock by way of 
purchase in the open market, tender offer, or otherwise without Topps's 
consent, or to solicit proxies or seek to control Topps in any manner."275 
Upper Deck submitted formal offers for Topps both during and after 
the go-shop period.276  Although each of Upper Deck's bids was higher than 
Eisner's bids, Topps never negotiated with Upper Deck regarding antitrust 
issues, price, or the reverse break-up fee offered by Upper Deck.277  Topps 
released proxy statements containing material misstatements and omissions 
regarding Upper Deck's offers which "intentionally cast[ed] a negative light 
on Upper Deck's sincerity as a bidder."278  Upper Deck requested that Topps 
waive the standstill so that Upper Deck could "make a tender offer on the 
terms it offered to Topps and . . . communicate with Topps's stockholders," 
but the Topps board of directors refused Upper Deck's request.279   
Upper Deck, along with a group of Topps stockholders, sought a 
preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the stockholder vote on the merger 
with Eisner, to mandate that Topps correct material misstatements in the 
proxy statement, and to order Topps to waive the standstill provision so that 
Upper Deck could communicate with stockholders or make a tender offer.280 
Then-Vice Chancellor Strine granted the preliminary injunction, finding 
that Topps was most likely "misusing the [s]tandstill" and that the "Topps 
board [was not] using the [s]tandstill to extract reasonable concessions from 
Upper Deck in order to unlock higher value."281  Instead, Strine found that 
Topps’s refusal to waive the standstill prevented Topps stockholders from 
hearing Upper Deck’s version of events and from considering and accepting 
a higher offer.282  Upper Deck was unable to seek antitrust clearance because 
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it could not commence a tender offer or have an executed merger 
agreement.283  Ultimately, Vice Chancellor Strine found that the Topps 
board was "not using the [s]tandstill [a]greement for any apparent legitimate 
purpose."284 
In the wake of Topps, then practitioner, now Vice Chancellor, Travis 
Laster, wrote the following:   
The questions created by aggressive standstill agreements and 
subsequent waivers have been part of the Delaware counseling 
mix for some time.  Without any meaningful decisions on the 
issue, however, concerns regarding potential fiduciary duty 
issues were often given short-shrift.  Topps confirms that the 
use of standstill agreements and reliance on them to foreclose 
subsequent bids are areas that must be approached with 
particular care.285 
A board of directors’ decision to waive or to refuse to waive an 
executed standstill so that a party can make a topping bid is a delicate 
subject.286  A particularly sensitive question with respect to standstills is 
when a board of directors may legitimately promise not to waive the 
standstill provision.287  In Topps, Vice Chancellor Strine alluded to such a 
situation by imagining a hypothetical final round auction with three 
bidders.288  In that scenario, Strine suggested the target board might 
legitimately promise the highest bidder certain deal protection provisions 
including a promise not to waive the standstill.289  However, because this 
 
                                                                                                         
283Id. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 
18(a) et seq. (2006), before a company may file for antitrust clearance a definitive acquisition 
agreement or a letter of intent must have been executed.  KLING & NUGENT, supra note 8, § 
5.04[2], at 5-184. 
284Topps, 926 A.2d at 92. 
285Travis Laster, Must Read Decision: VC Strine Enjoins Merger Vote Topps Case, DEAL 
LAWYERS (June 18, 2007, 8:25 AM), http://www.deallawyers.com/blog/archives/000779.html. 
286See Subramanian, supra note 17, at 659-62 (discussing the implications of a board of 
directors releasing non-public information during the sales process and the role a standstill plays in 
releasing non-public information).  
287See, e.g., Alexander B. Johnson, Is Revlon Only Cosmetic?: Structuring a Merger in the 
mid-1990’s, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2271, 2283-84 (1995) (discussing the Delaware Supreme  
Court's holding in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., where the court found no Revlon 
triggering event occurred "because the remaining shareholders still controlled the corporation, as 
the standstill agreement retained in them the power to elect sixty percent of the company's board").  
288Topps, 926 A.2d at 91 n.28. 
289Id. 
40 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 37 
was only dicta, it remains unclear how extensive such an auction process 
must be before such a promise may be made. 
An equally interesting issue is the enforceability of a promise made 
by a bidder not to request a waiver from the standstill provision, or           
"Don't-Ask-Don't-Waive" provisions.  A few recent Delaware Court of 
Chancery cases involving the approval of class action settlements shed 
some light on the possible treatment of such provisions.   
The first case, In re Celera Corporation Shareholder Litigation,290 
involved the sale of Celera Corporation ("Celera").  When first considering 
a transaction, Celera engaged financial advisor Credit Suisse Securities 
(USA) LLC ("Credit Suisse") to explore through "targeted discussions with 
potential counterparties" a sale of the company's individual assets, business 
segments, or the entire company.291  Credit Suisse contacted nine potential 
bidders and five of the nine executed confidentiality agreements with 
Celera.292  The confidentiality agreements contained a standstill preventing 
the bidders from "making offers for Celera shares without an express 
invitation from the Board."293  The agreements also "contained a broadly 
worded provision preventing the signing parties from asking the Board to 
waive th[e] [standstill] restriction (the 'Don’t-Ask-Don't-Waive 
Standstills')."294  
After an extended sales process and several stops and starts, Celera 
eventually entered into a merger agreement with Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 
("Quest") pursuant to which Quest would commence a twenty-one-day 
tender offer for Celera common stock at $8 per share.295  The Celera-Quest 
merger agreement contained a $23.45 million termination fee amounting to 
3.5% of the transaction’s total value, "but [was] arguably as much as 10% 
of Celera's enterprise value"; a no-shop provision requiring Celera to end 
any "existing discussions, and not to solicit competing offers from, potential 
bidders other than Quest;" and a top-up option providing that if Quest 
obtained over 60% of Celera's voting power, it could then acquire as many 
shares as necessary to exceed 90% of Celera's voting stock.296  After 
announcement of the merger agreement, a Celera shareholder brought a 
class action suit against Celera and Quest alleging, among other things, the 
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Celera board had breached its fiduciary duties by entering into the 
agreement with Quest.297 
Pursuant to the settlement negotiated with the lead plaintiff, Celera 
and Quest agreed, among other things, to reduce the termination fee to 
$15.6 million and to modify the no solicitation provision so that bidders 
subject to the Don't-Ask-Don't-Waive provision would be invited to submit 
bids.298     In upholding the settlement agreement, Vice Chancellor Donald F. 
Parsons, Jr. was careful to state he was not declaring Don't-Ask-Don't-
Waive standstills as generally unenforceable, and added that because of the 
prevalence of these provisions, any such judgment could only be in the 
context of an “appropriately developed record."299  However, he stated the 
"[p]laintiffs have at least a colorable argument that these constraints 
collectively operate to ensure an informational vacuum."300  Parsons further 
explained that once in the "informational vacuum," the board would not 
have any information pursuant to which it could evaluate whether 
continuing to comply with the merger agreement terms would violate the 
board's fiduciary duties.301  As a result, he stated, "[c]ontracting into such a 
state conceivably could constitute a breach of fiduciary duty."302 
In a settlement hearing held just weeks before the Celera decision 
was issued, Vice Chancellor Laster went further in his questioning of Don't-
Ask-Don't-Waive standstills.  In that case, In re Rehabcare Group, Inc. 
Shareholders Litigation, Vice Chancellor Laster stated: 
I do think it is weird that people persist in the "agree not to 
ask" in the standstill.  When is that ever going to hold up if it’s 
actually litigated, particularly after Topps?  It's just one of 
those things that optically looks bad when you're reviewing the 
deal facts.  It doesn't give you any ultimate benefit because 
you know that the person can get a Topps ruling making you 
let them ask, at a minimum, or can ask in a back channel way. 
 Why would you hurt yourself in terms of the optics by asking 
for that?  One of those strange things in life.303 
 
                                                                                                         
297Id. 
298Celera, 2012 WL 1020471, at *7. 
299Id. at *22.  
300Id. at *21.  
301Id.  
302Id.  
303Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 46, In re Rehabcare Group, Inc. S'holders Litig., 
C.A. No. 6197-VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011). 
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Although both Vice Chancellors Parsons and Laster’s comments are 
essentially solely dicta, the comments do shed some light on Delaware's 
stance on Don't-Ask-Don't-Waive standstills.  Such comments illustrate that 
a Delaware court is unlikely to uphold such a provision, particularly when it 
would result in the target’s board being willfully blind to alternative bids 
that may maximize stockholder value.   
Just as this Article was going to print, the Delaware Chancery Court 
issued two significant rulings that provide direct insight into the future of 
Don't-Ask-Don't-Waive standstills. On November 27, Vice Chancellor 
Laster had the opportunity to further review Don't-Ask-Don't-Waive 
standstills in In re Complete Genomics, Inc. Shareholder Litigation.304  In 
that case, Laster compared Don't-Ask-Don't-Waive standstills to no-talk 
provisions declared invalid in Phelps Dodge.305  In particular, Laster stated,  
So in my view, by analogy to Phelps Dodge, a Don't Ask, 
Don't Waive Standstill is impermissible because it has the 
same disabling effect as the no-talk clause, although on a 
bidder-specific basis. By agreeing to this provision, the 
Genomics board impermissibly limited its ongoing statutory 
and fiduciary obligations to properly evaluate a competing 
offer, disclose material information, and make a meaningful 
merger recommendation to its stockholders. With respect to 
the Don't Ask, Don't Waive Standstill provision, therefore, the 
   plaintiffs have established a reasonable probability of 
success on the merits that that provision represents a promise 
by a fiduciary to violate its fiduciary duty, or represents a 
promise that tends to induce such a violation.306 
Thus, at least if Vice Chancellor Laster has his way, Don't-Ask-Don't-
Waive standstills may soon be history.  
However, less than three weeks after Vice Chancellor Laster's ruling, 
Chancellor Strine weighed in on Don't-Ask-Don't-Waive standstills, calling 
them "the emerging issue of December of 2012," in In re Ancestry.com Inc. 
Shareholder Litigation.307  In the ruling Chancellor Strine scrutinized Don't-
 
                                                                                                         
304  Telephonic Oral Argument and the Court’s Ruling, In re Complete Genomics, Inc. 
S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012).   
305  Id. at 14-18.  
306  Id. at 18.  
307 The Court’s Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 19, In re 
Ancestry.com Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012). 
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Ask-Don't-Waive standstills, but was more careful to take a fact based 
approach and not make a per se ruling, limiting the precedential value of 
bench rulings generally and the potential reach of Complete Genomics and 
Celera.308 Strine contemplated that Don't-Ask-Don't-Waive standstills could 
be used consistently with a board’s fiduciary duties, but only if used to 
accomplish a specific value-maximizing purpose.309  Strine went on to find 
that, had the board not waived the Don't-Ask-Don't-Waive provisions, it 
would not have been using the Don't-Ask-Don't-Waive standstill for a 
specific value-maximizing purpose.310  In light of the waiver, Strine's order 
merely required disclosure of the circumstances surrounding the use and 
waiver of the Don't-Ask-Don't-Waive provision.311 
2.  Covenant to Cease All Existing or Previously Conducted Discussions 
The example of the Marsh Supermarkets, Inc. ("Marsh") acquisition 
highlights a merger agreement that imposed contractual limitations on a 
target's ability to accommodate indications of interest pre-closing.                
In October 2005, after evaluating strategic alternatives for responding to 
economic pressure and declining profit margins, Marsh hired Merrill Lynch 
 to begin gauging the interest of potential buyers and conduct an auction 
process.312   
After Merrill Lynch had contacted twenty-seven strategic and 
financial parties in December of 2006, Marsh entered into confidentiality 
agreements with twenty-one of those parties—including Sun Capital 
Partners ("Sun").313  In the process of the early bidding activity that 
followed, Marsh received preliminary indications of interest from ten of 
 
                                                                                                         
308 Id. at 20-22 ("And the Celera case expressly went out of its way to say it's not making 
a per se rule.  I think what Genomics and Celera both say, though, is Woah, this is a pretty potent 
provision."). 
309 Id. at 23-24 ("But the value-maximizing purpose has to be to allow the seller as a well-
motivated seller to use it as a gavel, to impress upon the people that it has brought into the process 
the fact that the process is meaningful; that if you're creating an auction, there is really an end to 
the auction for those who participate."). 
310 Id. at 24-26 ("I think the plaintiffs have pretty obviously shown that this board was not 
informed about the potency of this clause.  The CEO was not aware of it.  It's not even clear the 
banker was aware of it. . . .  None of the board seems to be aware of this.  The only way it has 
value as an auction gavel is if it has the meaning I've just described. It was not used as an auction  
    gavel. . . .  I think that probabilistically is a violation of the duty of care."). 
311 Id. at 26. 
312Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 10, 23    
(June 16, 2006). 
313Id. at 23. 
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those parties, covering a broad price range from $7.50 to $18.00 per share.314 
 Meanwhile, after the public announcement that Marsh was considering 
strategic alternatives, several unsolicited parties stepped forward to express 
interest.315 On December 21, Cardinal Paragon, Inc. ("Cardinal")—one of 
these new bidders who had not been initially contacted by Merrill Lynch—
reviewed public information and submitted an indication of interest that 
valued Marsh between $11.00 and $13.00 per share.316  Marsh dismissed 
Cardinal's indication of interest in light of the previously mentioned 
indications that were more lucrative.317 
Three other potential investors, including Sun, remained involved in 
the bidding process.318  On February 22, 2006, Merrill Lynch requested that 
each party to submit its best and final offer by March 16.319  Shortly 
thereafter, Cardinal re-entered the picture when it informed Merrill Lynch it 
was prepared to submit a revised indication much higher than its initial 
indication, and on March 13, Cardinal and Marsh signed a confidentiality 
agreement containing a standstill provision.320  On March 17, Cardinal 
drastically increased their indication of interest, this time valuing Marsh 
between $18.00 and $20.00 per share.321   
On March, 20, Sun stated that it was prepared to execute a cash deal 
that would pay Marsh between $10.00 and $13.00 per share.322  While the 
offer was subject to Sun’s completion of due diligence, Sun indicated it 
could finalize a definitive agreement within thirty days323 and would only 
proceed if Marsh agreed to an exclusive negotiation period.324  Although 
Marsh promptly rejected the exclusivity request, the two parties continued 
negotiations.325  
In April of 2006, the negotiations heated up.326  On April 3, an 
unnamed party submitted an indication interest valuing Marsh at $10.47 per 
share.327  On April 7, Sun revised its estimate to $10.00 per share.328  On 
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320Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 312, at 25. 
321Id. at 26. 
322Id. 
323Id. 
324Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 312, at 26. 
325Id. 
326See id. at 26-28. 
327Id. at 26. 
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April 14, Merrill Lynch notified Cardinal that Marsh’s board of directors 
would be meeting on April 18, and it would be prudent for Cardinal to 
submit a revised offer of value before the meeting took place.329  Cardinal 
sent a response to Marsh explaining that, although it was undecided as to 
the current figure it was willing to offer, it estimated it would be between its 
December valuation ($11.00 to $13.00 per share) and its March valuation 
($18.00 to $20.00 per share).330  In the same correspondence, Cardinal stated 
it could revise its bid by the end of the following week, but it would only 
move forward on an exclusive basis.331  Marsh rejected this exclusivity 
request, just as it had done to Sun’s.332  Meanwhile, also on April 14, Merrill 
Lynch continued its communication with Sun.333  As a result of negotiations 
that took place between April 14 and April 18, Sun submitted a revised 
offer of $11.00 per share.334  
On April 17, Merrill Lynch’s communications with Cardinal revealed 
three pieces of information that likely contributed to the Marsh board’s 
ultimate willingness to finalize an agreement with Sun.335  Cardinal stated 
that committed financing could not be obtained without further information 
from Marsh, indicated that sixty  days were needed to complete due 
diligence, and requested to be compensated for up to $1 million for their 
diligence efforts.336  Marsh’s board met on April 18 and, ultimately, after 
discussing its options, instructed Merrill Lynch to offer exclusivity to Sun if 
it could negotiate a deal for $12.00 per share.337  In making its decision to 
move forward with Sun, the board considered, among other things, the fact 
that Sun had offered a firm price, and that Sun could execute the transaction 
without a financing condition.338  
After further negotiation by Merrill Lynch, on April 20, Sun 
countered the $12.00 per share price with an offer to increase its price to 
$11.125 per share.339  Sun conditioned its offer on the return of a signed 
letter of intent, which would have bound parties to a twenty-one day 
                                                                                                         




332Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 312, at 26. 
333Id. at 27.  
334Id. 
335Id.; see also Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., Definitive Additional Proxy Soliciting Materials 
(Schedule 14A) (Sept. 7, 2006) (providing a simplified summary, via PowerPoint presentation, of 
reasons underlying the Marsh board's decision to proceed with Sun). 
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exclusivity period so that Sun could complete diligence efforts and work 
towards finalizing the merger agreement.340  
In response to Marsh's execution of a letter of intent with Sun, 
Cardinal re-entered the picture, this time with a partner; on April 27, 
Cardinal and its new partner jointly submitted a conditional, non-binding 
indication of interest to Merrill Lynch indicating a willingness to pay 
$13.625 per share.341  Cardinal also indicated that it could be ready to 
finalize a definitive agreement, without a financing condition, within fifteen 
days.342  On April 28, the Marsh board met to discuss their options.343  It was 
clear that Cardinal’s offer had the Marsh board’s attention because it 
discussed the implications of violating its exclusivity agreement with Sun.344 
Ultimately, however, the board chose to proceed with Sun; the board was 
not willing to risk losing Sun as a prospective buyer, which it determined 
could have been the result if they pursued negotiations with Cardinal.345  
After Marsh decided to proceed with Sun, the parties finalized the 
deal between Marsh and two affiliates of Sun, MSH Supermarkets and MS 
Operations, and executed a merger agreement on May 2, 2006.346  Shortly 
after the announcement of the deal Cardinal responded and, pursuant to its 
aforementioned standstill, sought Marsh's permission to make a formal 
offer.347  Reiterating the price of $13.625 per share, Cardinal communicated 
to Marsh that it was prepared to enter into a deal similar in structure to the 
one executed by Sun, but its offer was still subject to satisfactory 
completion of due diligence.348  After consulting with its attorney, the Marsh 
board decided to seek Sun's permission to waive the standstill provisions of 
the Marsh-Cardinal confidentiality agreement.349  Sun subsequently rejected 
the request for consent to waive, and Marsh then relayed that information to 
Cardinal.350  Cardinal responded with a marked agreement with terms 
 
                                                                                                         
340Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 312, at 27. 
341Id. at 28.  At this point in the negotiation process, Cardinal had partnered with 
Drawbridge Special Opportunity Investors, LLC and the two acted together for the remainder of 
the deal.  Id.  Cardinal and Drawbridge will be collectively referred to as "Cardinal."   
342Id.   
343Id.  
344Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 312, at 28. 
345Id. ("The board . . . discussed the risk that if [Sun] walked away, there could be no 
assurance that a definitive agreement could be reached with Cardinal and Drawbridge or that the 
price per share in any such definitive agreement would equal or exceed $11.125.").  
346Id.  For purposes of this Article, MSH Supermarkets and MS Operations will be 
collectively referred to as "Sun."   
347Id. at 29.  
348Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 312, at 29.  
349Id.  
350Id. at 29-30. 
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"substantially similar" to the agreement with Sun and also conveyed its 
position that Marsh was not required to obtain Sun’s consent to waive the 
standstill provisions.351  Cardinal maintained this position in the ensuing 
communications between the parties, during which Sun repeatedly sought to 
assert that Marsh would need its consent before granting Cardinal 
permission to make a formal proposal.352 
On May 30, Marsh issued a press release publicly announcing its 
communication with Cardinal.353  Pursuant to its agreement with Sun, Marsh 
was required to issue a press release within 10 business days stating its 
opposition to any publicly disclosed competing transaction; otherwise, Sun 
would have the right to terminate the agreement and collect a fee of $10 
million.354  On June 12, Marsh issued a press release expressing its 
opposition to the competing transaction from Cardinal.355  Nevertheless, 
Marsh sought to consider Cardinal’s indication of interest: on June 16, 
Marsh’s board resorted to the Indiana Superior Court to clarify the 
interpretation of the Marsh-Sun agreement.356 
As evidenced by the derivative suit that the shareholders eventually 
filed, Marsh’s shareholders were interested in seeing whether Cardinal’s 
indications of interest would develop into a superior offer.357  With a 
potential $2.50 per share at stake, Marsh’s board filed suit, naming as 
defendants Sun and Cardinal.358  Faced with these competing interpretations 
of the merger agreement, the issue before the court was whether Marsh—
under the provisions of the Marsh-Sun merger agreement—could 
"unilaterally consent to receive and consider Cardinal's indication of 
interest."359  
The first provision at issue was Section 5.1(n), which stated in the 
pertinent part: 
 
                                                                                                         
351Id. at 29.  Additionally, Cardinal indicated its willingness to enter into a definitive 
agreement within "a few days," again with a price of $13.625 per share.  Id.  
352Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 312, at 29. 
353Id. at 30. 
354Id. 
355Id. (speculating that, without such a press release, Sun could have proceeded to 
terminate the ensuing merger and collect the $10 million termination fee). 
356Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 312, at 30 ("[W]e 
filed a complaint in the Hamilton Superior Court, Hamilton County, Indiana, naming . . . [the] 
defendants."). 
357Id. at 31. 
358See Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., Additional Definitive Proxy Soliciting Materials 
(Schedule 14A), Exhibit 99.2 (Aug. 2, 2006).  
359Id. at 3.  
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[Marsh] covenants and agrees that, except (i) as expressly 
provided in this Agreement, (ii) with the prior written consent 
of [Sun] . . . 
(n) neither [Marsh] nor any of its Subsidiaries shall waive or 
fail to enforce any provision of any confidentiality agreement 
or standstill or similar agreement to which it is a party . . . .360  
Based on its interpretation of this provision, the court held the Marsh 
board would not have "'waive[d]' any provision . . . by consenting to review 
Cardinal's indication of interest."361  Furthermore, even if Marsh had granted 
Cardinal permission to make its offer, Marsh would not have been in 
violation of the explicit terms of Section 5.1(n) because it would not have 
waived or failed to enforce the standstill it had with Cardinal.362 
The second provision at issue, Section 5.5(d), contained a no-shop 
paired with a fiduciary out.363  However, this provision also contained a 
further limitation on Marsh’s rights, as follows: 
[Marsh] will . . . cease and cause to be terminated immediately 
all existing discussions or negotiations with any Persons 
conducted on or before the date hereof with respect to any 
Competing Transaction.364 
Marsh did not actively solicit Cardinal’s conditional non-binding 
indication of interest and therefore, by the terms of a basic no-shop 
provision, Marsh would have been able to consider Cardinal's interest 
 
                                                                                                         
360Id. at 6.  
361Id. 
362Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., Additional Definitive Proxy Soliciting Materials, supra note 
358, at 6.  
363See id.  Notably, the court's analysis implied Cardinal's indication of interest would 
have fallen into the merger's definition of a "competing transaction," which Marsh was prohibited 
from actively pursuing under section 5.5(a)(i).  See id., at 7 n.3.  Nevertheless, the court found that 
when reading sections 5.5(a)(i) and 5.1(n) in tandem, Marsh was allowed to consider and review 
Cardinal's indication of interest without obtaining prior consent from Sun.  Id. (concluding Marsh 
may "passively" receive and review indications of interest based on an analysis that 
"harmonize[d]" sections 5.1(n) and 5.5(a)(i)).  Thus, according to the court, if Marsh had actively 
pursued  Cardinal's indication of interest, such action by the board would have constituted a 
furtherance of a competing transaction.  Id. 
364Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., Additional Definitive Proxy Soliciting Materials, supra note 
358, at 9 (emphasis added).  
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without violating Marsh's agreement with Sun.365  In comparison to a typical 
no-shop provision, the court found that this covenant imposed more 
stringent limitations on Marsh.366  The court found while Marsh's board 
could consider some unsolicited indications of interest, it could not consider 
any competing transaction proposals with parties who had engaged in 
discussions or negotiations prior to the signing of the merger 
agreement.367  Consequently, "Marsh [could] not consider an indication of 
interest from Cardinal under any circumstances."368  Based on the court's 
logic, on the date that Marsh signed the contract, Marsh agreed that it would 
not engage in negotiations or discussions with any person who had 
previously been a party to the auction process.369  Because Marsh and 
Cardinal had been in prior discussions, Marsh had an obligation to Sun to 
terminate discussions with Cardinal as of the date of the merger 
agreement.370  
As a last line of defense, Cardinal sought to assert that the court's 
decision would usurp the board's ability to fulfill its fiduciary duties to the 
shareholders.371  Rejecting this contention, the court found that Cardinal did 
not have standing to assert the alleged injury suffered by Marsh's 
shareholders.372  On September 22, the shareholders approved the merger 
agreement that Sun and Marsh had agreed upon over four months earlier.373  
Of particular note is that in November of 2006, Cardinal entered into 
a $215 million sale/leaseback agreement with Sun, whereby Cardinal 
acquired Marsh’s former real estate assets from Sun.374  Thus, Sun went on 
 
                                                                                                         
365See id. at 7 n.3.   
366Id. at 9. 
367Id. at 9-10. 
368Id. at 12.  
369See Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., Additional Definitive Proxy Soliciting Materials, supra 
note 358, at11-12.  
370Id.  Notably, section 5.1(n) of the agreement is seemingly rendered superfluous by  
section 5.5(d).  If a target company enters into a definitive agreement with a buyer, it seems that 
the language within section 5.1(n), regarding waiving or enforcing standstills, presupposes that the 
target had previously entered into standstills with another party (or multiple parties).  Moreover, if 
such a standstill is in place, while it may depend on how a court interprets the words "discussions 
or negotiations," the language of section 5.5(d) would likely preclude the target from considering 
any indications of interest from parties who had executed standstills prior to the merger 
agreement.  Thus, perhaps section 5.1(n) has no effect at all when it is coupled with 5.5(d).   
371Id. at 13. 
372Id. at 14. 
373Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Item 8.01 (Sept. 22, 2006).  
374See Client List:  Marsh Supermarkets, CARDINAL CAPITAL PARTNERS, 
http://www.cardinalcapital.com/clients.php?id=45 (last visited Sept. 7, 2012) ("To help finance its 
acquisition, Sun Capital sought a sale-leaseback partner to acquire all of Marsh's viable real estate 
assets for approximately $215 million, or two-thirds of Sun’s acquisition price. . . . Cardinal 
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to realize the profits that could have been money in the pockets of Marsh's 
shareholders had the board been able to pursue Cardinal's offer.375  
IV.  STANDSTILLS:  PROMISES MADE TO BE BROKEN? 
This Article assumes that standstills should be a part of the pre-
signing sales process and the legitimacy of requiring a standstill to be 
executed pre-signing is not up for debate.376  Despite that assumption, 
standstills raise a number of unanswered questions under Delaware law as 
described in Part I of this Article.  Namely, those questions revolve around 
a target board's ability to consider a third party superior offer made in 
contravention of a standstill; its promise not to waive a standstill; and a 
board's ability to grant a "winning" bidder the right to enforce a previously 
executed standstill against a "losing" bidder.  These questions bring to light 
a conflict between a board’s Revlon duty to maximize stockholder value and 
its ability to protect an executed transaction under Unocal.  This section 
addresses how Delaware courts would likely answer these questions and 
resolve this Revlon-Unocal conflict. 
A.  Promises Meant to be Broken? Offers Made in Contravention of a 
Standstill 
One of the overarching questions Delaware courts have yet to   
address is whether a target must enforce a previously executed standstill if a 
bidder makes a higher bid after the target has executed a merger agreement 
with another bidder.  In other words, must a target enforce a standstill when 
a losing bidder has broken its promise not to submit an overbid?377  This 
open question has been repeatedly articulated in recent literature.378  As 
Professor Steven Davidoff pointed out during the HCP-Ventas battle for 
Sunrise, "Delaware may or may not enjoin a bidder from breaching a 
standstill to offer a competing higher bid or otherwise allow a company to 
contractually override its fiduciary duties to consider a higher, competing 
bid."379  Moreover, commentators have also stated: 
                                                                                                         
Capital Partners successfully closed on the $215 million sale-leaseback in November 2006."). 
375Id.  
376Whether standstills should be part of the pre-signing sales process will be addressed in a 
separate work-in-progress tentatively entitled Auction Theory and Standstills: Dealing with 
Friends and Foes in a Sale of Corporate Control, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2207693.    
377Davidoff, supra note 22 (framing the question in the context of the Ventas decision).  
378Id. 
379Id. 
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[E]ven if a bidding participant in the sale process signs a 
standstill agreement, the agreement's enforceability may be 
open to question.  The harm to shareholders of precluding a 
bidder who is subject to a standstill agreement from making a 
bid above that resulting from the auction process may lead a 
board or a court to decline to enforce, at least by an injunction, 
the standstill agreement, depending upon the circumstances of 
the situation.380 
As seen in the various deals described throughout this Article, the 
circumstances of the situation can vary greatly from deal to deal and courts 
tend to address deal protection devices, including standstills, as part of the 
larger sales process.  It follows that the circumstances of the situation may 
include facts pointing to the possibility the target board was acting out of its 
own self-interest in agreeing to proceed with one bidder over another or 
otherwise using the standstill as a way of favoring one bidder over another.  
When considering the individual circumstances of each deal, Delaware 
courts would likely consider the value maximization methods used pre-
signing.  That is, the Delaware courts are likely to consider how well 
"shopped" a deal was in determining whether a target must consider a third 
party's offer.   
1.  Evaluating the Target Board's Actions in Deciding Whether to 
Enforce a Standstill 
As Vice Chancellor Laster recently stated, "Delaware has a strong 
interest in policing the behavior of fiduciaries who agree to final-stage 
transactions.  This is particularly so when the illicit behavior is secretive 
and subversive, yet appears to elicit yawns from Wall Street players who 
regard it as par for the course."381  This policy interest is all too applicable in 
the context of standstills.  Although the Delaware courts have yet to define 
 
                                                                                                         
380Arthur Fleischer Jr. & Alexander R. Sussman, Responses to Takeover Bids: Corporate, 
SEC, Tactical, and Fiduciary Considerations, 6-4th CORP. PRAC. SERIES (BNA), § XII (2012), 
available at 2011 WL 121413; see also Soren Lindstrom & Cedric Powell, Standstill 
Considerations in an M&A Context: Recent Developments and Some Practice Pointers, K&L 
GATES LLP (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.klgates.com/standstill-considerations-in-an-ma-context-
recent-developments-and-some-practice-pointers-03-01-2012/ ("[I]t is difficult for a target to  
litigate a standstill if it has put itself up for sale, as it may very well be perceived as management 
entrenchment and preventing the shareholders from receiving maximum value.").    
381In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 842 (Del. Ch. 2011) (citation 
omitted). 
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the parameters of standstills, they have most often examined standstills to 
determine whether the target board was using the standstill for an 
inequitable purpose.382  Along these lines, in Topps, then-Vice Chancellor 
Strine indicated that standstills will not be upheld when the standstill is not 
being used to further "any apparent legitimate purpose."383  This is 
consistent with the Unocal-enhanced scrutiny standard applicable to deal 
protection devices.384  However, what types of purposes must be articulated 
to qualify as "legitimate" is an open question.  Moreover, a related issue 
arises once a purpose has been articulated.  That is, would the articulation of 
a purpose such as maximizing stockholder value overcome questionable 
behavior by the target's board?   
Two deals explored earlier in this Article provide further clarification 
of the facts a Delaware court may consider in determining whether a 
purpose is legitimate.385  First, consider the Northrop-Marietta fight for 
Grumman during which the Grumman board stated that it favored  Marietta 
because of its willingness to maximize the cash consideration in the deal.386  
Northrop alleged it should have been invited to submit an offer before an 
agreement was entered into with Martin-Marietta.387  Thus, the question 
becomes whether the Grumman board's failure to ask Northrop to submit an 
offer and entering into a merger with a $50 million termination fee were 
meant to maximize stockholder value or were in bad faith.  Viewing the 
transaction now, it appears the board's actions fall into the former category. 
 This conclusion is particularly supported by the fact that when Marietta 
attempted to force Grumman to enforce the standstill, Grumman's Chairman 
responded by asking how Grumman would be damaged by Northrop's offer 
made in contravention of the standstill.388  Any arguable impropriety did not 
involve the use of the standstill itself.    
At least initially, Grumman did not use the standstill to further any 
favoritism towards Marietta, or otherwise improperly prevent Northrop 
from making an offer.389  Northrop was given several months to negotiate 
 
                                                                                                         
382See generally In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007)   
(elaborating on the potential misuse of standstill agreements in terms of both denying opportunity 
to stockholders, and obscuring the truth from them).  
383Id. at 92. 
384For a discussion of the Unocal standard of enhanced scrutiny, see supra Part II.A.2.  
385See also supra Part III.B.1 (discussing legitimate purpose in the context of Topps). 
386Grumman Corp., Solicitation, Recommendation Statements, supra note 202, at 10-11. 
387Grumman Corp., Amended Solicitation, Recommendation Statements, supra note 227, 
Exhibit 99.C18, at 1. 
388See text accompanying supra note 233. 
389Grumman Corp., Solicitation, Recommendation Statements (Schedue 14-D9), at 12  
(Mar. 9, 1994). 
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with Grumman and put its best offer forward.390  It was only      after 
Northrop seemingly could not produce a favorable offer and Grumman 
entered into the Marietta agreement that the standstill could have been used 
improperly.391  Had Grumman not released Northrop from its standstill 
obligation, there may have been a different outcome, as the standstill would 
have prevented any further Northrop offers entirely.392  When confronted 
with the issue, Grumman promptly refused to enforce the standstill to allow 
Northrop to make an offer.393  Grumman did not use the standstill itself in a 
manner inconsistent with its fiduciary duties or otherwise for an 
"illegitimate" purpose.394  Hence, a Delaware court would likely have found 
that, although not perfect, Grumman’s actions were meant to extract value 
from Marietta and were intended to maximize stockholder value for 
Grumman shareholders. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum is the Formation-Fillmore 
bidding war for Genesis.  In that case, the Genesis board's actions pre-
signing seemed to favor Formation over Fillmore because of management’s 
preference to work for Formation rather than Fillmore.395  At the same time, 
however, the Genesis board was advised that Fillmore's offer was more 
favorable than Formation's offer.396  Despite this advice, Genesis entered 
into an agreement with Formation without providing Fillmore with an 
opportunity to increase its offer.397  The Genesis board did amend the merger 
agreement to allow a waiver of any pre-existing standstills so that previous 
bidders, specifically Fillmore, could overbid.398  But despite Fillmore's 
increased bid and the bidding contest that ensued between Fillmore and 
Formation, Fillmore's CEO alleged that Genesis again prematurely ended 
the bidding process by accepting Formation's offer of $69.35 along with an 
increased termination fee.399  Had Fillmore's offer been made in 
contravention of the standstill, similar to Northrop's offer, a Delaware court 
would have likely found that the Genesis board had been using the standstill 
 
                                                                                                         
390See supra Part III.A.2 (describing Northrop's negotiations with Grumman). 
391Grumman Corp., Solicitation, Recommendation Statements (Schedule 14-D9), at 3 
(Mar. 25, 1994) (discussing potential breaches of the established merger agreement between the 
two entities).  
392See id. at 4 (discussing not only the conditions for terminating negotiations, but also 
specifying damages).  
393Id. 
394Id.   
395See Part III.A.3. 
396See supra note 254 and accompanying text.   
397See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.  
398See supra note 262 and accompanying text.   
399See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.   
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inappropriately in an attempt to favor Formation over Fillmore because of 
Genesis management's preference to work for Formation.  If the standstill 
had not been waived, there would have been a considerable amount of value 
left on the table as evidenced by the number of upward bid revisions after 
the release.400  When considered in light of the fact that the Genesis board 
clearly favored Formation, it would seem that the standstill, if not waived, 
would not have been used for a legitimate purpose.  
2.  The Consideration of Pre-Signing Value Maximization Methods in 
Determining Whether to Enforce a Standstill 
In addition to considering whether a board used a standstill for a 
legitimate purpose, in the context of a change of control transaction the 
Delaware courts would consider the reasonableness of the board's decision-
making process generally.401  As explained in Part II.A.2, the Delaware 
courts will consider the "value maximization tool" used to determine 
whether a board has acted reasonably.402  Decades of Delaware precedent in 
the wake of Revlon have established that an auction process or, even an 
active bidding process, need not precede a board's entry into a merger 
agreement.403  However, at the same time, the more extensive the sales 
process pre-signing the more easily a board satisfies this reasonableness 
requirement.   Thus, to determine whether a board may (or must) consider 
an offer made in violation of the standstill, the Delaware Chancery Court 
would likely examine the amount of "shopping" done by the board pre-
signing.      If a pre-signing auction was held, and a number of bidders 
submitted offers, a Delaware court would be more likely to find that the 
board had satisfied its Revlon duties pre-signing.  In such a case, the court 
would likely find that the board would not have an obligation to waive the 
standstill post-signing. 
At the same time, however, a question remains as to how much pre-
signing shopping would be sufficient for a Delaware court to find that the 
 
                                                                                                         
400Genesis Healthcare Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), Exhibit 99.2 (Apr. 26, 2007) 
(the contents of the letter indicate a number of revisions).  
401See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing Delaware jurisprudence on a board’s fiduciary duties 
in the context of a negotiated transaction).   
402See In re OPENLANE, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2011 WL 4599662, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 
30, 2011). 
403See Marc A. Alpert & Alison H. Kronstadt, No Pre-Signing Auction Necessarily 
Required to Satisfy Revlon Duties, LEXOLOGY (May 29, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=63d2b0bc-e264-4b61-a6e3-7d224133760d (describing how courts allowed for more 
broad-base exploration of potential buyers by removing the shackles of these occasionally rigid 
requirements).  
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board does not have an obligation to consider a higher third party offer.  As 
with most M&A cases, Delaware would likely evaluate the amount of 
shopping required on a case-by-case basis.  A court would likely consider 
numerous factors including, but not limited to, the background and financial 
stability of the target, the industry in which the target operates, the market 
generally, and the length of sales process pre-signing.  Hence, a Delaware 
court is unlikely to announce a bright-line rule in the context of a 
standstill.404      
In determining whether a board may consider a third party offer made 
in contravention of a standstill, the Delaware courts will likely be forced to 
address the concept of a bona fide offer.  When drafting fiduciary outs, 
superior offer definitions, and termination provisions, practitioners often 
include a requirement that the third party offer be a bona fide one.405  Thus, 
a likely argument could be made by either a target board or an initial buyer 
that a third party overbid made in contravention of a standstill does not meet 
the bona fide offer requirement in the merger agreement. 
3.  The Fiduciary Out and Bona Fide Offer Requirement 
Of the deals outlined above, the HCP-Sunrise-Ventas conflict 
provides the clearest illustration of how, during the pre-closing period, bona 
fide language can create a threshold that an offer made in contravention of 
standstill must pass.406  While HCP argued that a bona fide Acquisition 
Proposal was "one that is 'genuine' or 'authentic' in the sense that it is not a 
sham and is reasonably capable of becoming a Superior Proposal," the court 
rejected HCP's argument.407  In doing so, the appellate court followed the 
superior court decision, which defined the term bona fide as "acting 'in good 
faith; sincere, genuine,'" and, consequentially failed to address HCP's 
assertion that the meaning of bona fide depends on context.408   
Essentially, the analysis below illustrates why a Delaware court 
would likely only assess one issue when determining if a bidder is bona fide 
 
                                                                                                         
404Vice Chancellor Parsons' comments in In re Celera Corporation Shareholder Litigation 
discussed in Part III.B.1 provide an excellent example of this hesitation.  The Vice Chancellor was 
careful to state that any decisions declaring "Don't-Ask-Don't-Waive" standstills unlawful would 
have to be made only in the context of a well-developed factual record. See supra text 
accompanying note 299.    
405See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the HCP-Sunrise-Ventas conflict, where the issue of 
bona fide offer arose).  
406See supra Part III.A.1. 
407Ventas, Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Inv. Trust (2007), 85 O.R. 3d 254,  
para. 61 (Can. Ont. C.A.).  
408Id. at para. 60. 
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(sometimes referred to as "assessing a party's bona fides"): whether the 
bidder has a good faith intent and ability to close a deal with the target.  
Chancellor Strine and a few prominent Delaware practitioners recently co-
authored an article, in which they noted, "[o]ur favorite examples of 
redundancy are when courts have used both good faith and its Latin 
equivalent bona fide in the same sentence."409  In light of the frequent 
association of the terms "bona fide" and "good faith,"410 they are used 
interchangeably in this section.  While ample case law and scholarly 
commentary can be found discussing good faith as it relates to a corporate 
director's duties, very few corporate law discussions specifically address 
which facts or circumstances are relevant when determining whether a 
bidder’s acts were in "good faith" or "bona fide."411  Thus, despite the 
association of these two terms, when assessing a bidder any attempt to 
apply points from fiduciary duty discussions raises an issue yet to be 
resolved by Delaware courts: whether the meaning of bona fide depends on 
the particular factual context.  Even if a Delaware court determined that the 
definition of bona fide should be context specific, the court would still face 
a second issue.  Specifically, the court would have to grapple with which 
factors would, or should, be considered when determining which bids are 
bona fide in the context of a fiduciary out. 
In his recent article, Chancellor Strine suggested a Delaware court 
would deviate from the Canadian courts and find "good faith" is a term that 
 
                                                                                                         
409 Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in 
Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 654 n.74 (2010). 
410 See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 199 (9th ed. 2009) (defining bona fide as           
"1. Made in good faith; without fraud or deceit. 2. Sincere; genuine"); Strine, supra note 409, at 
696 (recognizing that the terms "bona fide" and "good faith" are functionally equivalent); see text 
accompanying supra note 172 (identifying Ontario Superior Court's definition of bona fide as 
"good faith; sincere, genuine"). Also of note is that "good faith" has been defined as, 
A state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to 
one's duty or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to 
seek unconscionable advantage. — Also termed bona fides. Cf. BAD FAITH. — 
good-faith, adj. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 762 (9th ed. 2009).  In addition to these definitions, Delaware case 
law also associates bona fide with good faith.  See Smartmatic Corp. v. SVS Holdings, Inc., 2008 
WL 1700195, at *3 n.23 (Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 2008) (stating bona fide offers are those "made in good 
faith, given [the offer's] structure and its terms"). 
411See Corinne Ball et al., Advice for Corporate Directors, in MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 
2010: TRENDS AND DEVS., at 137, 213-14 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 
B-1781, 2010) ("Restrictions on the nature of the bidders are common although frequently not 
litigated.  Common examples are requirements that the third-party bidder be "bona fide" and that  
any such bid be fully financed or not subject to material conditions or conditions other than those 
in the primary agreement.").  
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is "relational" to the object and "requires a state of mind and resulting 
behavior faithful to one's contextual obligations."412  It follows, based on the 
relationship between good faith and bona fide and Strine's intimate 
understanding of Delaware corporate law, that a Delaware court would 
likely agree with HCP’s assertion that determining which bids are bona fide 
is a     "decision [that] must be made in the context of the entire 
situation."413  
Assuming a Delaware court would find the meaning of bona fide 
depends on context, the next issue to be addressed is what bona fide should 
mean in the context of fiduciary out provisions.  Looking outside of the 
Canadian standard and Strine's good faith discussion, other sources indicate 
that, when determining whether a buyer is bona fide, an analysis of a 
bidder's bona fides should focus on whether the "purported [buyer]" has the 
ability and "intent [to] complet[e] the transaction."414  If a Delaware court 
applied this standard (hereinafter, the "Intent to Close Standard") when 
assessing a bidder's bona fides, then any third party who exhibited intent  
and ability to close a deal with the target would be considered bona fide.415  
The Intent to Close Standard is different than the standard applied by 
the Ontario courts (hereinafter, the "Canadian Standard").  For example, in 
contrast to the Canadian Standard, the Intent to Close Standard would   
allow the target board to transact with any bidder that is willing and able to 
execute a deal – regardless of whether the bid was made in contravention of 
a standstill.416   
This author proposes a number of factors that could be considered by 
a board (and a court reviewing a board's decision) as indicators of a bidder's 
intent to close the deal.  These factors include the existence of any financing 
 
                                                                                                         
412Strine, supra note 409, at 646.  
413Ventas, 85 O.R. 3d at para. 60. 
414Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Change of Control Board: Federal Preemption of the Law 
Governing a Target’s Directors, 70 MISS. L.J. 35, 100 (2000); see also James T. Halverson & 
Ronald C. Wheeler, Negotiating Merger Consent Decrees, 2 ANTITRUST 23, 27 (1988) (stating 
"bona fide" should be "interpret[ed] . . . in a similar fashion to 'qualified'").  
415As such,  bidders with a good faith intent to close a transaction could be distinguished 
from bidders that are either puffing or posturing with the sole intent to bump up the price for a 
competitor. 
416Even though the initial buyer would not be protected by bona fide language in the case 
of a third party's breach of a standstill, the breach still exposes the third party bidder to the risk 
that either the target or initial buyer may still have a claim for tortious interference with contract.   
      See Ventas, Inc. v. Health Care Prop. Investors, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 2d 612, 618-19 (W.D. Ky. 
2009) (articulating elements of tortious interference with contract, including third party bidder's 
intent to cause the target to breach an existing contract).  In addition to its relevance for tortious 
interference with contract, breach of a standstill might also be relevant to a plaintiff's claim of 
tortious interference with prospective business advantage.  See id. at 621.  
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conditions in the offer, completion of due diligence efforts by the bidder, 
size and other characteristics of the bidder as they relate to potential ability 
to fund the transaction, and other terms or conditions of the offer.  
Additionally, and particularly pertinent to this Article, the target board 
could consider even a buyer's prior willingness to execute a standstill when 
determining whether the buyer intends to complete the transaction.417  
Ultimately, under the Intent to Close Standard, when applied to mergers in 
the Revlon context, the basic question a court will face is whether the target 
board can justify its affirmative determination that a bidder has a bona fide 
intent and ability to close a deal that maximizes shareholder value.  
One circumstance that could potentially complicate matters for the 
target board, or a reviewing judge, would be the existence of competition 
between the initial buyer and the party seeking to jump the deal.418   A 
bidder could want to drive the price up for its competitor by submitting a 
bid during the pre-closing period.  More problematically, if the bidder is 
careful, this intent to drive up the price could potentially be concealed 
because the average bidder probably would not be as disturbingly blatant as 
HCP was about non-bona fide intent.  However, because it would hardly be 
surprising for a competitor to seek to acquire another competitor—in the 
absence of other indications that the party seeking to jump the deal lacks the 
intent to close the transaction—a court would likely find that the mere 
existence of competition between the parties should not be interpreted as a 
determinative indication that the party is not bona fide. 
Thus, in sum, when confronted with a third party offer made in 
contravention of a standstill, a Delaware court will not likely follow the 
Ontario courts’ reasoning that the offer is not bona fide simply because the 
offer was made in breach of a standstill.419  Instead, the court will examine 
(or require a board to examine) whether the third party had an intent to 
close. Moreover, in determining whether a board has an obligation to 
consider that offer pursuant to its fiduciary duties, the courts will likely 
consider the value maximization tools used by the target board in deciding 
to sell the company, as well as the purpose articulated by the board in 
applying the standstill.   
 
                                                                                                         
417See supra Part II.B (describing how standstills can be indicators of a bidder's 
seriousness). 
418See Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc., 2009 WL 2912779, at *3-*4 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 8, 2009) 
(finding an existence of competition between Ventas and HCP and discussing how competition 
relates to tortious interference analysis). 
419See, e.g., Ventas, Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Inv. Trust (2007), 85 O.R. 
3d 254, para. 61 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (holding that violation of a standstill precludes an offer from 
being deemed bona fide).   
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B.  An Enforceable Promise?  Promises not to Waive a Standstill and a 
Board’s Fiduciary Duties 
A related issue to the board's obligation to enforce a pre-existing 
standstill is the board's ability to agree not to waive a standstill.  As when 
deciding on the validity of a standstill, when considering an agreement to 
not waive or fail to enforce a standstill, the Delaware courts would likely 
look to whether the provision was used for a legitimate purpose and the 
amount of shopping done prior to the agreement.420  In Topps, then-Vice 
Chancellor Strine alluded that there may be situations where a target board 
may legitimately agree not to waive a standstill.421  Specifically, Strine 
pointed to a multiple round auction involving three final round bidders all 
of which occurred after a broad market canvass.422  Strine postulated in that 
scenario a target might be able to promise not to waive a standstill to extract 
additional value from the auction participants.423  Strine again annunciated 
this idea in Ancestry.com, further stating that in the context of Don't-Ask-
Don't-Waive standstills, a specific value-maximizing purpose should exist, 
and stated that such a purpose may exist if a "well-motivated seller . . . 
use[d] it as a gavel"  to signal that "there is really an end the auction."424   
Consistent with Chancellor Strine's hypothetical in Topps, a Delaware 
court may likely require the target's pre-signing shopping be more extensive 
when a board is agreeing pre-signing not to waive a standstill agreement in 
the future.  Underlying Strine’s view, the requirement of further shopping is 
necessary because of the greater restrictions that an agreement not to waive 
would impose on a board of directors to exercise its fiduciary duties under 
Revlon.425   
The Cardinal-Sun battle for Marsh426 provides a good illustration of 
the amount of shopping that may be required during the pre-signing before a 
target may enforce an agreement not to waive a standstill.  Although 
Marsh's actions would be questionable under Revlon value-maximization 
principles, they must be considered in light of the significant amount of 
 
                                                                                                         
420See, e.g., In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 n.28 (Del. Ch. 2007) 




424The Court’s Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 19, In re 
Ancestry.com Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS, 23-24 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012).  
425See Topps, 926 A.26 at 91 ("[T]he Topps board reserved the right to waive the 
Standstill if its fiduciary duties required.  That was an important thing to do, given that there was 
no shopping process before signing . . . ."). 
426See supra Part III.B.2.  
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shopping done by Marsh.  Because Marsh's board had engaged in an 
extensive sales process,427 a court would likely find that its actions were 
reasonable, although not perfect.  Cardinal had the opportunity to submit 
two indications of interest and refine its offer by the point Marsh entered 
into an agreement with Sun.428  Cardinal was given ample time to negotiate 
and could be blamed for failing to use its time wisely.429  Because Marsh had 
been dealing with Cardinal for a while, provided it the opportunity to define 
a more concrete proposal, and had been shopping for so long, the Marsh 
board knew Cardinal and knew the value of Marsh’s shares.430  While 
Marsh’s reasons for agreeing to the merger agreement provisions when 
another bidder was present may have been weak, the Marsh board must 
have believed that the possibility for increasing value through entertaining 
the Cardinal offer was not as real as it seemed.  A bird in the hand is better 
than two in the bush, and Marsh obtained the highest value reasonably 
attainable.  If a Delaware court were reviewing the facts of this case, the 
court would likely uphold Marsh's promise not to waive the standstill.   
Reconsider the hypothetical bidding war between Bidder A and 
Bidder B for Target and Target’s promise not to waive all previously 
executed standstills, including the one with B.431  The limited facts of the 
hypothetical appear to be very similar to those alluded to by Chancellor 
Strine in Topps; namely, an active auction process with three final round   
bidders.432  Although in the A-B-Target hypothetical there are only two final 
round bidders, assuming the board and its financial advisor fairly enforced 
the auction rules and there was no self-dealing or entrenchment issues on 
the part of Target's board, a Delaware court could likely find that Target's 
promise not to waive the standstill is an enforceable one.433  At the same 
 
                                                                                                         
427See Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., supra note 312, at 31 (describing, in detail, the 
voluminous number of steps and communications required to move the sale forward).  
428Id. at 26.  
429E.g., id. at 31 (describing the six month period the company had to locate valid 
financing).  
430See supra Part III.B.2. 
431See supra Part I. 
432In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d at 91 n.28.  
433This is how I believe a Delaware court would act based on previous cases and 
Delaware’s application of Revlon, Unocal, and their progeny.  I should note, however, that this is 
not how I believe the Delaware courts should act.  In particular, in a previous article, Rethinking 
Contractual Limits on Fiduciary Duties, I argued that certain situations might call for a limitation 
on the board’s ability to act post-closing in the context of a fiduciary out.  Sautter, supra note 33, 
at 60.   More specifically, I advocated for a narrower merger recommendation out in certain 
circumstances.  Id. at 96-101.  However, as I made clear in that article, I do not believe that a 
target's board of directors should be able to limit itself from withdrawing its recommendation in 
favor of a transaction in the event the target has received a superior offer.  Id. at 98 n.251.  Along 
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time, however, as indicated in Celera,434 Rehabcare,435 Complete 
Genomics,436 and Ancestry.com,437 the Target should exercise due care when 
requiring potential bidders like B to agree not to ask for a waiver.  A 
Delaware court is likely to find that, absent a calculated goal, binding a 
bidder to such an agreement in advance prevents the target's board from 
exercising its ability to adequately weigh its options pre-closing should 
circumstances change. 
C.  An Enforceable Promise or a Promise Meant to be Broken?  A 
Board's Grant to a Winning Bidder of the Right to Enforce a Standstill 
Another open issue under Delaware law is whether a target board 
may legitimately grant a winning bidder the right to enforce a standstill 
against an overbidder.  As previously discussed, Sunrise granted Ventas 
such a right "to enforce any existing Standstill Agreements with third 
parties" in the Sunrise-Ventas definitive acquisition agreement executed 
after Ventas won the auction.438  The Canadian court upheld the grant;439 
however, Delaware courts have yet to directly address this issue and it is 
unclear whether Delaware courts would do the same.440   
The main concern with such a grant is that the winning bidder has 
"very different incentives than the target's Board" and thus could prevent a 
third party's rebid.441  By granting a winning bidder the right to enforce a 
standstill against a third party overbidder, the target's board is essentially 
delegating its fiduciary duties to the third party.  Such a delegation was 
                                                                                                         
these lines, the board also should not be able to completely limit itself from considering an overbid 
that is or may become a superior offer.  By promising not to waive a standstill, a target would be 
doing exactly that.     
434In re Celera Corp. S'holder Litig., 2012 WL 1020471, at *21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012) 
(asserting that these sorts of agreements not to request a waiver, in combination with standstills, 
are more troublesome).  
435Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 46, In re Rehabcare Group, Inc. S'holders Litig., 
C.A. No. 6197-VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011) (questioning the validity of agreements not to ask for 
a standstill waiver after Topps). 
436Telephonic Oral Argument and the Court’s Ruling, In re Complete Genomics, Inc. 
S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012). 
437 The Court’s Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, In re 
Ancestry.com Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012). 
438Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc., 647 F.3d 291, 299 (6th Cir. 2011). 
439Ventas, Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Inv. Trust (2007), 85 O.R. 3d 254, 
paras. 34-35 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
440Former Chancellor, now Professor William T. Allen alluded to this very issue recently 
by asking,"[i]f a Special Committee in an auction or quasi-auction process contractually obligates 
bidders not to overbid, is such a contract term enforceable, and if so, by whom?"  See Allen, supra 
note 21, at 52.   
441Spatt & Martelli, supra note 94, at 37. 
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deemed to be invalid in the context of a no-shop provision in Ace Ltd. v. 
Capital Re Corp.442  In that case, then-Vice Chancellor Strine stated a board 
may not agree to a provision that requires "an abdication by the board of its 
duty to determine what its own fiduciary obligations require at precisely 
that time in the life of the company when the board's own judgment is most 
important."443  Although in many situations, in granting a winning bidder   
the right to enforce a standstill, the board is not explicitly allowing the 
winning bidder to step into the shoes of the target board; said board is 
implicitly doing just that.  The winning bidder has, in most cases, an 
overwhelming interest in protecting the transaction for which it negotiated 
and, as such, it has profound reasons for not granting a waiver of a standstill 
to allow a rebid.           
There are, however, limited circumstances in which a board could be 
able to curtail its power to entertain superior proposals in the context of a 
transaction that is subject to a shareholder vote.444  Specifically, in Ace, 
Strine stated such a limited circumstance may be "where a board has 
actively canvassed the market, negotiated with various bidders in a 
competitive environment, and believes that the necessity to close a 
transaction requires that the sales contest end."445  But at the same time, 
Strine noted that "where a board has not explored the marketplace with 
confidence and is negotiating a deal that requires stockholder approval and 
would result in a change in stockholder ownership interests, a board's 
decision to preclude itself—and therefore the stockholders—from 
entertaining other offers is less justifiable."446 
In his December 2012 bench ruling in Ancestry.com, Chancellor 
Strine seemed to follow his reasoning in Ace with respect to the grant of the 
right to enforce a standstill.447  Specifically, he stated if the board decided to 
use a Don’t-Ask-Don’t-Waive standstill as a "gavel" then the shareholders 
should be informed 
that the board made the cost/benefit trade-off that the best way 
to get the value was to draw the highest bid out from those 
people while they were in the process; that in order to do that, 
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443Id. at 106. 
444See id. at 107 (noting that, in the case sub judice, that the board's complete refusal to 
consider another offer was well outside the range of such circumstances).  
445Id. at 107 n.36. 
446Ace, 747 A.2d at 107 n.36. 
447The Court’s Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 19, In re 
Ancestry.com Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS, 27-28 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012).  
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it had to incur the cost of giving to the winner the right to 
enforce it.448 
If the Delaware courts were to extend Strine's reasoning in Ace and his 
suggestion in Ancestry.com, a court considering a third party's right to 
enforce the standstill would likely again engage in the same examination of 
the pre-signing shopping process as previously described throughout this 
section.449  Applying this analysis in the case of A and B's battle for Target, 
a Delaware court would likely uphold A's ability to enforce the standstill as 
granted and promised by Target.  Thus, when ultimately presented with the 
various issues addressed in this Article, a Delaware court is likely to find 
that standstills, and other promises relating to standstills, are enforceable 
promises under the facts and circumstances of many cases.      
V.  CONCLUSION 
Standstill agreements are a common promise made during the sale of 
a company.  However, standstills can create a conflict between a target 
board’s duty to maximize stockholder value in a sale of control, or Revlon 
duty, and the board’s ability to protect an executed agreement as permitted 
by the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Unocal and its progeny.  The 
conflict is particularly evident after the target has executed a merger 
agreement with a "winning bidder" and a "losing bidder" makes a higher 
offer for the target in contravention of the standstill. 
 
                                                                                                         
448  Id.   
449Although the Delaware courts would likely extend Strine's reasoning in Ace so that the 
pre-signing sales process may be considered, I do not believe from a normative perspective this 
should be the case.  These limited circumstances should not even be considered in providing the 
winning bidder with the contractual right to enforce the standstill.  The target's grant of this type of 
right extends the delegation of power at issue in Ace to a new level.  More specifically, the no-
shop provision at issue in Ace prevented the target board from providing information to a third 
party who made an overbid and from engaging in discussions or negotiations with the third party 
until certain requirements were satisfied.  Ace, 747 A.2d at 98. Among these requirements was that 
the target board had to make the determination "based on the written advice of its outside legal 
counsel, that participating in such negotiations or discussions or furnishing such information [was] 
required in order to prevent the Board of Directors of the Company from breaching its fiduciary 
duties to its stockholders . . . ."   Id. (emphasis added).  In contrast to the written opinion in Ace 
that was found to be an improper delegation of the board's fiduciary duties, granting a winning 
bidder the right to enforce a pre-existing standstill is a far more extreme delegation of a board's 
fiduciary duties.  By granting a winning bidder such a right, the board is in essence granting the 
winning bidder the right to determine when a third party overbid is or is not a Superior Offer under 
the terms of the no-shop fiduciary out.  As such, by promising the winning bidder this right, the 
target board is making an unenforceable promise. 
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This overbid, or the potential for it, raises a number of questions that 
Delaware courts, and academics alike, have yet to address.  Those questions 
revolve around a target board's ability to consider a third party superior 
offer made in contravention of a standstill; its promise not to waive a 
standstill; and a board’s ability to grant a "winning" bidder the right to 
enforce a previously executed standstill against a "losing" bidder.  When 
ultimately presented with these questions, Delaware courts will answer each 
question by examining the value maximization tools utilized by the board 
during pre-signing to determine the reasonableness of the board's decision-
making process.  Namely, the court will consider the extent to which the 
board "shopped" the company pre-signing.  Moreover, in determining 
whether the board can decide not to consider an offer, agree not to waive a 
standstill, or grant the "winner" the right to enforce a standstill, the courts, 
in accordance with Unocal, will also consider the purpose of the board’s 
actions under the circumstances of each case.  Specifically, if a valid value 
maximization purpose is articulated and the board is not acting to further its 
own self-interests, then a Delaware court would likely find the board's 
actions to be reasonable and uphold the board's promises.  In addressing 
these questions, this Article attempts to fill a thirty-year void in academic 
literature regarding the interplay of standstills and a board’s fiduciary duties 
during the pre-closing period.  
